A Certain Gamble: Institutional Change, Leader Turnover, and their effect on Rivalry Termination

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Abstract

Previous research shows that leader turnover and change in a leader's winning coalition are associated with rivalry termination. However, this research often conflates change in leadership or winning coalition with more fundamental reform of the institutions governing the state. This article argues that only changes in a rival's governing institutions should lead to rivalry termination. Changes in leader preferences may lead to conciliatory policies, but provide no certainty regarding the sincerity or longevity of these policies. Fundamental change to the institutions of a state alter the menu of policy options available to the leadership and are difficult to undo. Institutional reform in Rival A makes the leadership of Rival B more willing to undertake potentially risky cooperative action, leading to rivalry termination. I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry terminations spanning 1919-2010, finding that institutional reform in one rival leads to an increase in the likelihood of rivalry termination regardless of the issues of contention. Irregular leader turnover and change in a state's winning coalition have no effect. Further, in a break with previous research, I find that any institutional reform –toward autocracy, toward democracy or laterally –is associated with an increased likelihood of rivalry termination.

Introduction

The extreme suspicion and animosity that exists between geopolitical rivals makes for great difficulty in resolving their outstanding disputes. This is the case even when resolving these disputes would be beneficial to both parties (Rooney, 2018; Owsiak & Ryder, 2013; Dreyer, 2012; Morey, 2011; Prins & Daxecker, 2008; Hass, 2007; Colaresi, 2004; Cornwell & Colaresi, 2002; Bennett, 1997a; Bennett, 1997b; Goertz and Diehl, 1995). Maintaining a rivalry is costly for both states (Colaresi 2005), and ending a rivalry and the significant defense spending that goes with it provides domestic benefits (Mintz & Stevenson, 1995; Ward & Davis, 1992). However, a leader is likely to lose power if their attempts to improve relations with a rival are not reciprocated (Colaresi, 2004). Thus, the leadership of both states will find it difficult to offer a figurative olive branch, despite the reality that maintaining the rivalry is a drain on both states' domestic resources. Because rivalry is maintained by the continuing competition over disputed issues between rivals (Dreyer, 2010 & 2012; Hensel, 1999); that rival leaders are unwilling to gamble on dispute resolution measures ensures that the rivalry will continue.

Recent research on rivalry termination has largely turned toward an examination of the domestic politics of rivalry in an attempt to account for variation in peacemaking activities between rivals. Much of this scholarship centers around a nascent debate as to whether changing domestic institutions (Prins & Daxecker, 2008; Haas, 2007) or changing domestic political preferences and actors (Rooney, 2018; Cox 2010; Dreyer, 2012) best explain the end of rivalry. Both positions note that ending the rivalry by resolving the underlying disputes can provide significant benefits to a state and its leader, but attempts at dispute resolution also require the leader to accept significant political risk. This dilemma suggests that only events that provide a high degree of certainty that a leader's attempt at dispute resolution will be reciprocated should be associated with an increased likelihood of rivalry termination. I argue that leadership turnover and changes in a rival's governing coalition do not lead to

rivalry termination. While leadership change may lead to a change in the preferences of one rival regarding military competition, these changes provide little certainty to the opponent that overtures of peace will be accepted if the new leadership must make policy within the same institutional framework as the previous leadership. Rather, it is major institutional reform –regime change –that causes a clean break with past policy-formation processes and provides a rival the certainty required before they will risk making concessions to resolve the disputes that sustain the rivalry.

In the remainder of this paper, I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry termination for the period 1919-2010. I introduce a new measure of rivalry termination using the Thompson & Dreyer (2011) rivalry inventory, but that relies on the formal settlement of all existing disputes between rivals as the primary criteria for measuring a rivalry's ending. This measure is meant to remedy the skepticism with which Thompson & Dreyer suggest their own, more subjectively coded end dates should be viewed (p.12). I find that institutional regime change is an important predictor of rivalry termination. Previously theorized predictors such as changes in the source of leader support and irregular leader transitions have no effect on rivalry termination and sometimes appear to extend rivalries. Among domestic shocks, only the replacement of one institutional regime by another appears associated with rivalry termination.

Rivalry Termination

Previous research has identified a number of factors at the international level that are associated with rivalry termination. Much of this research focuses on the loss of the ability to sustain militarized competition whether due to economic exhaustion, or military weakness (Rasler et al., 2013; Thompson & Dreyer 2011, Darnton 2011). Unsurprisingly, decisive wars or military occupation of one rival are very likely to end rivalry (Morey, 2011). Other system-level explanations of rivalry termination tend to center around powerful shocks to the international system including World Wars, but also major shifts in the distribution

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of power or territory among great powers (Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Goertz & Diehl, 1995). Finally, Owsiak and Rider (2013) note that the settlement of territorial disputes seems to be the key to resolving many rivalries, thus factors that help resolve these disputes should also help to end rivalries.

Two primary schools of thought exist regarding domestic politics and rivalry termination. One emphasizes changes in domestic institutions as a cause of peace, and the other argues that changing winning coalitions and policy preferences bring peace between rivals. Prins & Daxecker (2008) argue that liberalizing institutions allow rivals to resolve their disputes. Democracies are expected to punish leaders for reneging on international agreements and opposition parties are thought to have little incentive to coordinate in a bluff against the rival (p.25). As a result, democratic states provide credible information regarding their intentions and democratic leaders have stronger incentives to honor their agreements (p.25-26). Thus, increasingly democratic institutions in the dyad should allow rivals to overcome information and commitment problems and resolve their outstanding disputes. Haas (2007) similarly emphasizes the importance of liberalization in ending rivalry. In examining the end of the Cold War, Haas argues that changes in Soviet foreign policy, domestic policy, and military power had little effect on the beliefs of U.S. policymakers as to the viability of dispute-resolution between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (158-161). American policymakers withheld anything more than symbolic cooperation until the liberalization of Soviet institutions in 1989. Institutional change provided U.S. policymakers a level of certainty that Soviet behavior had fundamentally changed, allowing for cooperation without fear of Soviet betrayal (p. 165-170).

In contrast, Rooney (2018), Dreyer (2012), and Cox (2010) emphasize changes in leadership and in ruling coalitions to account for variation in the end of rivalry. Dreyer notes that irregular leadership turnover brings new political preferences and ideologies into power (p.475) that will end ideological riavlries but should have no effect on spatial or positional

rivalries (482-484). Drawing on Bennett (1997) and Cox (2010), Bryan Rooney (2018) examines the effects of changes in the societal groups that a leader draws support from, arguing that when new leaders come to power who rely on a different coalition of supporters to maintain power, that new political preferences are brought into power that precede changes in foreign and domestic policy. This change in governing coalitions will bring actors into power who derive no benefits from the rivalry, but who support compromise and reconciliation instead of continued competition (970-917).

Preferences Change and Rivalry Termination

Many previous studies of domestic politics and rivalry termination focus on the state undergoing domestic political changes and how these changes are likely to influence that state's policy positions (Rooney 2018, Cox 2010, Bennet 1997a/b). These studies emphasize that significant changes in leader preferences cause change in policy positions that maintain the ongoing disputes that make up a rivalry. Thus change in the winning coalition should be associated with rivalry termination. However, these studies largely ignore the reaction of Rival B –the state undergoing no domestic change– or implicitly assume that Rival B will react with cooperation to any perceived overture of peace on behalf of Rival A. Previous research has shown that ending a rivalry requires that both sides take cooperative steps to reduce tension and demilitarize their interactions (Rasler, Thompson, & Ganguly 2013). Thus when contemplating the effect of domestic political change on rivalry termination, we must take into account the actions and preferences of *both* rivals.

Importantly, Colaresi (2004) demonstrates that the leadership of Rival B may have incentives not to reciprocate Rival A's overtures of peace in many cases. If the leader of Rival B is seen by their own domestic audience to be overly cooperative with Rival A, this significantly increases the probability that the leader will be removed from office (Colaresi 2004). Thus change in policy preferences in State A presents leader B with a dilemma. On the one hand she may reap the benefits of a peace dividend by ending the ongoing costs associated with

rivalry.[1] But on the other hand, the sucker's payoff to be had from cooperating with a rival that feigns dovish intentions can be disastrous for both leader and country. Cooperative action on the part of one rival –even when backed by sincere benign intent –is insufficient to end rivalry. Rivalry will only end once it can be credibly established that the new leader is both sincere in their cooperative disposition, and as important, that *future leaders* will not renege on the agreements made. Changes in leadership or even in the winning coalition provide little certainty as to the sincerity or longevity of a new leader's expressed cooperative preferences so long as they occur within a stable institutional context. This point has been addressed several times in previous research. Hensel (1999, 1996) draws upon an evolutionary theory of rivalry to provide an alternative explanation as to why one rival would be unwilling to easily trust an overture of peace made by another. Specifically, he argues that a leader bases their future expectations of a rival's behavior on that rival's past behavior (1999 p.184-186). Thus as it relates to this study, in Hensel's framework rivalry will persist even in the face of attempted cooperation unless the opposing rival can be made certain that a clear break has occurred in Rival A such as to convince the leadership of Rival B to overlook that past history and assess an offer of cooperation independent of past behavior. Similarly, Rasler, Thompson & Ganguly (2013) posit that shocks that cause a major change in the domestic politics of one rival *can* serve to alter expectations about that rival's future behavior thus allowing room for cooperation where it did not exist before. However, they also note that whether a given political shock helps to encourage cooperation depends largely on the extent to which the change in Rival A serves to contradict preexisting notions about A's hostility (p.16-17).

This latter point –that to end rivalry, domestic political changes must prevent new leaders from pursuing hostile policies –is central to the arguments put forward by both Prins &

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[1]See Mintz & Stevenson (1995), and Ward & Davis (1992) for a discussion on peace dividends and their impact.)

Daxecker (2008) and Haas (2007). However, in both of these analyses it is assumed that only a shift toward more democratic institutions can prevent new leaders from continuing in belligerence (Prins & Daxecker, 2008 p.25-27; Haas, 2007 p.155-156). Recent analysis by Bas and Orsun (2021) demonstrates that when one state engaged in a dispute is uncertain of the other state's regime type –and thus is uncertain of that state's likely conflict behavior – that this motivates the leadership of the first state to behave cautiously in a crisis bargaining situation regardless of the level of democracy present.[2] I expand upon these previous analyses by demonstrating that it is not only democratization that can end rivalry, but rather, that any sufficiently large change in a state's governing institutions can provide assurance that new leaders will not revert to the old pattern of rivalrous behavior.[3]

Institutional Change, Certainty, and Rivalry Termination

Whether explicitly acknowledged or implicitly assumed, the concept of certainty is central to many of the arguments discussed above regarding factors associated with rivalry termination. The dilemma that leaders face –gains through peace on one hand and loss of office on the other –when contemplating cooperating to end a rivalry requires that this is the case. Decisive war outcomes end rivalries because they provide both sides with certainty that one side's military losses mean the militarized competition cannot continue. Similarly, world shocks like decolonization contribute to the end of rivalries by re-balancing world power making previous rivals no-longer militarily or economically competitive. I contend that ar-

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[2]In their study, Bas and Orsun demonstrate that this cautious approach to the dispute leads to the peaceful resolution of crises. I argue in this paper that similar uncertainty about a rival tends to prolong rivalry. These arguments may appear to be in tension, but I see significant agreement between them. Crisis bargaining and rivalry termination differ in what it means to behave cautiously. In the crisis situation, the fear is unwanted war or loss of a war. Thus the cautious move is to avoid conflict. In the rivalry termination case, the fear is in giving the rival an opening to exploit. Thus, the cautious move is to maintain the status quo, including maintaining a strong defense and deterrent, and refusing cooperative gestures. In both cases, however, uncertainty about the adversary's intentions motivates caution.

[3]Though I note that a new regime need not be stable *per se* for the logic laid out below to hold. The key element is that the change in institutions provides certainty that there is "no going back" to the old way. A regime change that leads to a brutal crackdown is as likely to end rivalry as one that leads to a new domestically peaceful regime, so long as in both cases large elements of the old institutional structure appear to have been irrevocably rewritten.

guments that emphasize the effect of institutional change on rivalry termination provide an understanding of how changing domestic politics can also provide the level of certainty that is necessary to rivalry termination. I argue that major institutional changes provide the degree of certainty needed to overcome leaders' dilemmas in two ways. First, regardless of shifts toward or away from democracy, institutional change alters the menu of policy options that a leader can feasibly follow while still maintaining a base of support, eliminating some previously available options from feasibility while making new options feasible at the same time.[4] Second, institutional changes are more difficult to reverse than are changes in the preferences or within the leadership of an ongoing institutional regime.

Before continuing with this explanation, it is important to note that I use the terms regime change, irregular leader turnover, and change in a state's winning coalition as conceptually distinct from one another in important ways. Regime change is defined primarily by change in the norms and institutions by which a state chooses leaders and determines policy.[5] Conceptually, irregular turnover and change of winning coalition are both measures of change in the preferences of a state's leaders and are unconcerned with the change in the formal institutions of the state (Leeds & Mattes, 2015 p. 3-4). Both irregular turnover[6] and change in the winning coalition[7] can, but need not occur as part of a regime change. Conversely, regime change can occur without irregular turnover or change in the winning coalition. Empirically, regime change generally occurs without a change in the winning coalition when a state voluntarily reforms its institutions rather than being forced to do so by

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[4]In the example of Argentina below, for instance, the elimination of Peronism as a political force would seem to ensure that Videla could not follow a strongly Peronist set of policies while maintaining his base of support. However, the elimination of the Peronists also means that Videla no longer need worry about their response to his policies, opening policy options that would once have been too politically costly to consider.

[5]Here I use Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) definition of regime as a set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies.

[6]Defined as change of leadership in a manner not prescribed by the governing institutions (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009).

[7]Defined as change in the set of societal interests whose support allows the leader to gain and maintain power (Mattes, Leeds, & Matsumura 2016)

revolt or overthrow. This occurs occasionally when a former junta or single party allows competitive elections but then goes on to win those elections. This was the case in Albania when the Communist Party allowed elections in 1991. This also occurs when a leader comes to power through a normal process but then centralizes power, leading to an eventual regime transition. This occurred in 1979 Iraq due to Hussein's purge of the Ba'ath party. Additionally, this occurs often when an illiberal regime transitions between a pure and hybrid type, such as when an autocrat establishes or abolishes a functional legislative body.

I argue that irregular leadership turnover and change in a state's winning coalition, within an ongoing institutional regime, may represent change in the preferences of a government and lead to changes in policy.[8] However, this change does not signal a significant level of certainty to rivals that policy change will be long-lasting. Within many ongoing regimes, irregular leadership transitions can occur due to a leader's assassination or death in office, neither of which signal any great change in policy. Further, a number of states experience one or more "status-quo coups" that replace one leader with another without fundamentally altering the institutions of the state. This can occur when the government is a junta in which coup is the primary mechanism of leader replacement, or because the military returns to the barracks once a new leader is elected or installed according to the institutions of the state. Examples can be found in the Turkish coups of 1960 and 1971, the Brazilian coup of 1964, or in the forced resignation of elected leaders in a military-dominated hybrid regime such as occurred to Ecuador's Jaun Martínez in 1932 and Velasco Ibarra in 1934 and 1947. Similarly, a state's winning coalition can change significantly within an ongoing institutional regime. This occurs commonly in democracies when one party hands off power

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[8]It is common in the literature cited above to either explicitly or implicitly assume that any change in policy will, on average, be a change toward more peaceful policy where highly belligerent rivals are concerned (Rooney 2018 p.970-973, Bennet 1997b p. 374-375). I explicitly make use of this assumption as well and provide some justification for its use below. Ultimately, if this assumption had no basis in reality, then I would expect a null finding. That I and others find significant results in the expected direction –given this assumption –provides qualified evidence for its usefulness.

to another that is backed by a significantly different group of supporters, but also occurs in many autocratic states where different factions within a ruling elite contend to govern the country. This sort of within-regime turnover in the winning coalition can occur due to the previously mentioned status-quo coup, but also occurs when division of a ruling party brings a new faction to power –as in Argentina in both 1928 and 1932. These forms of political change do not alter the basic set of interests and preferences that a ruler can appeal to in order to maintain power, nor do they indicate that subsequent leadership changes would not lead to a reverse in any policy of detente.

In contrast, because regime change brings with it major changes in the institutions that govern leader selection and policy formation, regime change signals a clear break with past leadership and past policy.[9] Where other forms of leadership turnover may signal a change in the winning coalition that serves to govern the state, fundamental changes in the institutions that control leadership selection and policy formation represent change more akin to a fundamental reshaping of the selectorate from which the winning coalition may be drawn. This fundamental change realigns the set of preferences that a leader must respond to in order to build his or her support coalition. Following regime change, some previously influential actors or sets of actors who benefited from the status quo have been excluded from influence or have seen their influence significantly curtailed. This removes appeasement of those actors' preferences regarding the ongoing rivalry from the menu of policy-options available to a new leader. Other sets of actors that were excluded from influence under the previous institutional arrangement likely now hold a degree of influence over leader selection, and appeasing their preferences becomes a newly feasible means for the leader to maintain support. This

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[9]Importantly, it is not the case that a new regime bring immediate stability for this to hold. A regime that plunges the country into political chaos can also provide similar certainty of a break with past policy if it effectively eliminates the groups that supported the old regime as a viable political force. An example of this can be seen in several revolutionary states such as the early Soviet Union. In such cases, it is often unclear for some time who precisely will control the new government. However, it frequently *is* quite clear that the *old* regime has been thoroughly dismantled, and thus whoever ultimate attains power will not likely hold the same political interests.

should be true in *any* case in which regime change rearranges which societal groups hold power, no matter whether this change is liberalizing, autocratizing, or lateral on the polity scale.

Further, the institutional framework governing a state is more difficult to change than are the leader or their goals. Once accomplished, major changes to a state's governing institutions are harder to reverse than are changes in leadership or preferences. This relatively greater difficulty in reversing institutional changes has important implications for rivalry termination. In dealings between rivals, the sucker's payoff to be had if one is overly cooperative with a disingenuous rival is dangerous. Allowing a potentially dangerous enemy to take advantage of one's cooperative efforts places the state in peril and is likely to be catastrophic for a leader's continued political survival.[10] This means that a thaw in relations between rivals resulting from changes in a rival's policy stance – such as the thaw in the Cold War associated with Kruschev's de-Stalinization –are unlikely to end rivalry. Resolving the rivalry would provide significant additional gains for a leader seen to end the hostility on favorable terms, but policy is easy to reverse by the next leader. Thus, major changes in a rival's foreign or domestic policy will only lead to dispute resolution if the leader of the opposing state can be made highly certain that the thaw in relations heralds a permanent change in the rival's threatening stance. I argue that because fundamental changes to the institutions governing leader selection and policy making are difficult to reverse, they provide the degree of certainty that a new long-term relationship is possible. This assessment allows the leader to overcome natural risk-aversion and take the risky gamble of cooperation.

This dynamic was at play during the mid-1980's as members of the Reagan administration reacted to the reform process occurring in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Haas (2007) shows that from the beginning of Gorbachev's reforms in 1985 to the institutionalization of the

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[10]Colaresi (2004) provides strong evidence that leaders who allow themselves to be "suckered" by offering unreciprocated cooperation to a rival are highly likely to lose office.

reformist ideology at the 1988 Nineteenth Party Conference, American decision-makers were unwilling to accept the risky gamble of reducing arms or otherwise extending an olive branch to the Soviets. Haas uses primary documents from the time to show that key policy-makers in the Reagan administration were highly suspicious that Soviet policy-change represented an actual reorientation of Soviet goals (1997, p. 161-163). Rather, it was argued that Gorbachev's policies were, at best, likely to be reversed quickly by Soviet hard-liners after Gorbachev lost power (p. 165) and at worst, were meant to buy breathing space for the Soviet Union to reorganize so as to be more competitive with the United States in the long run (p. 168). Miles (2020) tells a similar story, stating that the Reagan administration engaged with Gorbachev, not in hopes of ending the Cold War, but rather in the hope of winning strategic advantages in a conflict that Reagan's advisors believed would take at least 60 years to resolve (p. 32).[11] Thus, we see that, absent fundamental institutional change in the U.S.S.R., American policymakers were unwilling to take risks to end the rivalry.

However, this pattern changed in 1988 with the Nineteenth Party Conference in which broad changes to the structure of government and selection of leaders were adopted by the Soviet leadership institutionalized Gorbachev's reform efforts. According to Haas's examination of primary sources, these institutional changes were critical to American leaders' willingness to embrace more cooperative relations with the Soviets. These reforms convinced American leaders that the underlying process of Soviet policy-making had changed (p. 167). In essence, the institutional changes enshrined at the Nineteenth Party Conference caused American leaders to reevaluate their estimation of the likelihood of successfully making

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[11]However, Miles' larger argument is that shifting power and a change from back-channel to overt dialogue starting shortly before Gorbachev came to power was crucial to the peaceful end of the Cold War. In this paper, I argue differently. Shifting power and the rise of more cooperative Soviet leadership during the Khrushchev era had previously lead to a thaw in relations but not an end to the ongoing competition. I expect the same would have occurred in the 1980's-1990's absent regime change in the U.S.S.R. Further, according to Miles, both sides expected their rivalry to continue long-term upon entering into these talks. Reagan sought to win advantages for a long-lasting contest at the same time Andropov, Chernenko, and –at least initially –Gorbachev sought breathing room to reorganize the Soviet economy and social structure so as to be more competitive in the future (p. 150-154).

gains by attempting to resolve their rivalry with the U.S.S.R. This prompted policy-makers to switch from a cautious wait-and-see policy to a more risky policy of active cooperation with the Soviet Union.

While the end of the Cold War demonstrates a case in which liberalizing institutions contributes to the end of hostilities, there are also many cases in which the centralization of power in one rival contributes to the end of a rivalry. A prominent case can be found in the Brazil-Argentina rivalry. Brazil and Argentina were engaged in rivalry from 1817 until 1980 over positional concerns about which state would dominate the region politically as well as disputed territory in their shared border region. Throughout the 1960's and early 70's, the two states engaged in a race to acquire nuclear arms technology, threatening to destabilize the region and the global non-proliferation regime (Resende-Santos 2003). However, by 1979 the two nations had resolved their territorial disputes and normalized relations for the first time in 40 years and by 1980 had signed a series of collaborative accords on nuclear cooperation and trade that signaled the end of the positional struggle for dominance in South America (Carasales 1995; Selceher 1985; Hilton 1985) and the creation of a durable security regime that remains in place today (Resende-Santos 2003).

This thaw in relations between the two old rivals can be traced to the 1976 rise of Videla's oppressive regime in Argentina and the beginning of the brutal National Reorganization Process that fundamentally rewrote the country's political and economic institutions (Resende-Santos 2003; Hilton 1985). Importantly for the argument made in this paper, the preceding 20 year period of Argentine history had seen a succession of new leaders and significant change in the governing ideology –alternating between left-wing Perónist leadership and right-wing military-backed leadership –but all within a poorly consolidate and weakly institutionalized period of volatility (Loureiro & Schor 2018). However, neither this political instability nor the alignment of interests between the occasional right-leaning Argentine governments and Brazil's right leaning military regime were sufficient to end the rivalry

during the 1955-76 time period. Videla –who assumed power in March 1976 –succeeded in consolidating his rule to a much greater extent than had previous governments through the brutal repression of dissent and the elimination of effective political opposition during the National Reorganization Process (Munck 1979). The elimination of Argentine leftists as a political force during the reorganization process served to ensure a long-lasting change in the policy options available to the Argentine government in a way that previous weakly-institutionalized rightist governments could not credibly promise. The consolidation of a military regime in Argentina meant that both the Argentine and Brazilian military regimes could expect to face a similar set of incentives and constraints due to their shared regime characteristics. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, these shared regime characteristics came with a significant shared goal in eliminating the ideological opposition and cooperating to prevent trans-national resistance movements from gaining traction (Resende-Santos 2003 p.118-120).[12] In December 1976 General Videla wrote personally to Brazilian leader General Geisel in hopes of building increased cooperation among the right-leaning governments of the Southern Cone. Brazilian leaders were more accepting of Videla's proposal than they had been of previous Argentine overtures. I argue that this is the case because the National Reorganization Process had fundamentally rewritten Argentine institutions in such a way as to ensure the elimination of Perónist influence on Argentine policy, thus making Videla's offer of cooperation credible in the long term. Shortly after Videla's ascension the two leaders entered into direct military-to-military talks to lay the groundwork for a mutually satisfactory settlement to their territorial disputes and bilateral nuclear accords to end the nascent nuclear arms race (Resende-Santos 2003). These agreements mark the end of 163 years of Argentine-Brazilian rivalry and the birth of a highly cooperative relationship in security and economic affairs.

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[12]Though the empirical evidence I present below suggests that regime change need *not* lead to the creation of a shared-regime-type dyad before peace is possible. Table 7 shows that many dyads that have ended with mixed-regimes after a change also make peace.

Observers will likely note that both Brazil and Argentina began the process of democratization not long after the settling of their differences and may argue that liberalization played the key role in easing tensions between Brazil and Argentina much as it did in the Cold War. However, an important strand in the literature suggests the opposite may be true –that peace breeds political liberalization –and this may explain the ending of the Brazil/Argentine rivalry or even the Cold War (Gibler and Tir 2014, Owsiak 2013, Gibler 2012, Gibler 2007). Other researchers have noted that states transitioning to democracy are actually *more* war prone (Mansfield & Snyder 1995), which further calls into question the extent to which we should expect democratization to terminate already existing rivalries. Ultimately, the evidence presented in this paper is not sufficient to truly adjudicate between the "peace-first" and "democracy-first" models. However, that I find both transitions to democracy and transitions to and between autocratic regimes to be associated with resolution of rivalries suggests that both models hold a kernel of truth. These findings may suggest that major institutional change of any kind can begin an important process of rapprochement in which increasing peace and political liberalization have a mutually reinforcing effect.

The insights developed above imply three empirical predictions. First, absent fundamental change in the institutional regime of Rival A, changes in state preferences (embodied in change in leadership or the governing coalition) promise no long-term change in policy. Thus, changes in leaders and preferences should not be associated with an increased probability of rivalry termination. Second, institutional changes signal a clear break with the past policy-formation process. This provides a degree of certainty that future foreign and domestic policy will diverge from the past policies that have maintained rivalry thus far. I expect that significant institutional change should be associated with an increase in the likelihood of rivalry termination even in the absence of change in the underlying preferences or winning coalition of the government. Third, when institutional change and change in preferences coincide, this signals a break with the foreign policy that maintained the rivalry

as well as a break with the prior regime's behavior regarding the rivalry. When regime and preference change coincide, Rival B's certainty regarding the possibility of dispute resolution should be heightened, thus I expect a further increase in the likelihood of dispute resolution when institutional change is accompanied by changes in leader preferences.

I offer the following three formal hypotheses:

Preferences: *Changes in leadership or coalition should have no effect on the hazard of rivalry termination when not accompanied by institutional change.*

Institutions: *Changes in state institutions should increase the hazard of rivalry termination regardless of changes in leader or coalition.*

Interaction: *When changes to both institutions and preferences occur simultaneously, there should be an additional increase in the hazard of rivalry termination.*

Measuring Rivalry Termination

Thompson and Dreyer (2011) note dissatisfaction with their measure of rivalry termination (p. 11). Their subjective approach to rivalries is said to be significantly less useful in pinning down end-dates for rivalries than it is for start dates. It is relatively common for the salience of a rivalry to die down at times, meaning few statements are made regarding the rival, despite the reality that suspicions linger on before flaring up anew later. Thus, coding the end date according to statements of mutual suspicion and hostility in primary documents is imprecise. Given this lack of precision, I propose a new measure of rivalry termination that draws upon Thompson and Dreyer's rivalry inventory, but applies a more consistent set of coding rules to identify end dates.

I follow Bennet (1997b) in conceptualizing rivalry termination as occurring at the point when two rivals agree to settle their outstanding disputes and then adhere to that settlement. This provides for a more concrete measure of the end point of a rivalry as compared to a measure that attempts to determine the point in time at which suspicion and perceptions

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of threat between two rivals has petered out. This operationalization relies on four coding rules. First, the rivals must sign an agreement or several agreements recognizing a mutually accepted settlement of the primary issues of contention in the rivalry, as identified by Thompson and Dreyer. Acceptance of this settlement must then be followed by a 10 year period without a militarized dispute related to the substantive issues of the settlement. The rivalry is then coded as ending in the year that the settlement is finalized. Second, if both rivals have renounced claims against the status quo, also followed by 10 years without a militarized dispute related to the issues at stake, the end of the rivalry is dated to the year in which the final claim is renounced.[13] Third, if a dispute does occur within 10 years of settlement or renunciation of claims, two possibilities are allowed in the coding. If the militarized dispute is resolved through a clarification of the original settlement and that dispute is followed by 10 years without an additional dispute, the end date of the rivalry is "moved" to the date of the resolution of the dispute. If, however, a dispute occurs that represents a clear abrogation or repudiation of the agreement or represents a new claim against the status quo, the rivalry is coded as continuing until such a time that further agreements are signed to settle outstanding disputes.[14] Finally, I also consider a rivalry ended if either rival state is occupied or annexed by a foreign power –the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, for example, ends the Iraq/Saudi Arabia rivalry. Given this final coding rule, I include a control for foreign occupation in my empirical analysis.

I use several sources to determine when states settle their disputes. I rely most heavily on the U.S. Library of Congress *Country Studies* series of publications and the United Nations *Treaty Series* to identify treaty dates. In cases where rivals' disputes are resolved by mutual acceptance of court rulings, I rely on International Court of Justice *Reports of Judgments Advisory Opinions and Orders.* Where required, I supplement these materials with primary

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[13]This is most often the case following a ruling by an international governing body such as the International Court of Justice, in which both states pledge to respect the ruling but sign no official treaty.

[14]Note that these are very similar to the coding rules used by Bennet (1997b)

and historical sources. Finally, Table 9 in the appendix provides a replication and extension of Rooney's 2018 analysis of rivalry termination that uses the original Thompson and Dreyer rivalry termination dates. This robustness check replicates the substantive findings that I present in my analysis, demonstrating that my findings are not a function of this new measure of rivalry termination.

My dataset includes 152 cases of rivalry during the years 1919-2010. 36 of these cases are right-censored at 2010 and 33 are left-truncated, beginning prior to 1919. Left truncated cases enter into the model at time equal to the age of the rivalry in 1919. This is in keeping with common practices in dealing with left-truncated rivalries (see Cornwell & Colaresi, 2002; Prins & Daxecker, 2008; Dreyer, 2012).[15]In this dataset there are 3,907 periods at risk.

I fit a series of Cox models on these data to test the hypotheses presented above. Because there exist many time-varying covariates in these data, I use the count process devised by Anderson and Gill (1982). Standard errors are clustered on the rivalry. In keeping with common procedure for using Cox models (Keele, 2010; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001), I test the proportional hazard assumption and find it violated for some variables. I apply a method suggested by Allison (1995) in which each co-variate is tested for violations of the non-proportionality assumption. An interaction between the offending variables and the natural log of the time variable is included in the model for offending variables.[16]

Operationalization

Leader, Preference, and Institutional Change

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[15]I also include in the appendix a replication of the main table in which I drop all rivalries from the sample that begin prior to 1919. The results of this robustness check are very similar to those present in the main analysis.

[16]However, I also use Schoenfield residuals to test the proportional hazards assumption and find little evidence to reject the proportional hazards assumption ($Chi^2 = 13.8$ on 9 degrees of freedom. $p < Chi^2 = 0.13$) and a test of Schoenfield residuals for each covariant reveals no additional evidence of non-proportional hazards beyond the Allison test. Given that the global test shows no violation, I also include simple Cox proportional hazards models in the appendix to demonstrate that my findings are not sensitive to this choice.

Previous analyses of rivalry termination (Rooney, 2018; Bennett, 1997) rely on the use of the PolityIV *durable* variable to measure regime change. Wright and Bak (2016) demonstrate that this is an inappropriate measure of the concept that both ignores many instances of regime change and also over-counts cases by concluding that regime change occurred in cases where no significant change to the exercise of power or leader selection took place. This is a key component of the difference between the empirical analysis presented here and those presented by Rooney and Bennet. The polity *durable* variable is a vague measure when used to proxy for regime transitions for two primary reasons. First, the durable variable is not an explicit attempt to measure institutional change. It is a measure of change in the *level of democracy* present in a country. This is a useful measure when testing hypotheses regarding the influence of democratization on political phenomenon. However, it is far less useful when attempting to test hypotheses regarding the influence of institutional change writ large, because it misses many major institutional changes that do not lead to a significant shift toward or away from democracy. Wright and Bak find that the *durable* variable fails to account for a large percentage of transitions between hybrid regimes and cases in which one autocratic regime is replaced by another (2016, p. 3). Overall, in the dataset used in my analysis, the Polity durable indicator fails to account for one third (33.1%) of all regime changes that appear in the GWF dataset.

These missing regime changes include the Kuomintang's seizure of power in 1928 China and the Cuban coup of 1933 that first brought Batista to power. A prominent case in which Polity fails to include regime changes can be found in Iraq. On 3 instances since 1946 Polity concludes that no regime change took place despite the complete overthrow and replacement of a regime. This includes the year 1958 in which the Hashemite monarchy of Faisal II was overthrown to establish the Iraqi Republic, 1968 when the republican government was overthrown by the Ba'ath party, and 1979 when Saddam Hussein purged the Ba'ath party and centralized power in a personalist dictatorship. In the case of Iraq, because these

four regimes are similarly autocratic[17] the *durable* variable captures no regime transitions despite fundamental changes in leader selection and policy-making. These uncounted regime transitions amount to an omitted variable in analyses that use the *durable* variable to proxy for regime change. To the extent that these uncounted regime changes correlate with other variables such as SOLS change or irregular leader transition, we would expect findings presented in analyses that use *durable* to control for regime change will suffer from significant omitted variable bias.

Second, the *durable* variable is also an approximation because it often measures change in formal institutions but frequently ignores actual political practice. This focus on formal institutions is problematic for a measure of regime change within autocratic regimes. Autocratic regimes are known to hide the de facto exercise of power behind a veneer of seemingly more democratic formal institutions[18]. Because Polity seems to focus heavily on formal institutions, measures of regime change based in Polity include a large number of false-positives where regime change is coded despite underlying consistency in leader selection and policy formation. Wright and Bak (2016) point out an important example in the case of Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, who legalized opposition parties in 1992, triggering a regime change according to the Polity definition. However, in practice Mobutu retained sole political control of the country for another 5 years through a combination of cooptation and suppression of opposition parties (Schatzberg, 1997; Lemarchand, 1992). Interestingly, the *durable* variable also fails to capture Mobutu's ultimate overthrow by AFDL rebels in 1997. This is not an isolated occurrence. Wright and Bak demonstrate that 44% of polity *durable* failures during 1946-2010 represent minor changes to a state's institutional regime that do not fundamentally alter leader selection or the exercise of power. The afore-mentioned case of Mobutu is one such example, as are *durable* failures in Iran that Polity codes to have occurred not only

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[17]Polity changes of -1 point, -2 points, and -2 points.
[18]See Levitsky & Way (2010) for a discussion of this.

with the 1979 revolution (which both measures agree on), but also in 1997, 2004 and 2009. These dates in Iran's history represent shifts in representation –such as the 1997 creation of political parties in parliament –but do not change the fundamentally consistent leadership of the Supreme Leader of Iran and the dominance of the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council over all major aspects of policy formation since 1979.

Using Polity to proxy for regime change leads to significant Type I and Type II error. I employ a measure of institutional change developed by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) to correct these errors.[19] The GWF measure is intended as a measure of change in formal and de facto institutions that govern selection of leaders and the policy-formation process. Detailed coding rules for this measure can be found in the GWF codebook (Geddes, Right and Frantz 2013), but can be summarized by saying that their expert coding of regime change relies on 3 primary rules; 1, Did the de-facto method of choosing leaders (election, dynastic succession, party-vote, etc.) change? 2, Did the de-facto rules for choosing leaders and policies change such that the leader or policy-makers are drawn from a different social group (military, single-party, etc.) than before? 3, did the de-facto allocation of political power within the government change (such as through creation or abolition of a functioning parliament)? Answering yes to any one of these leads to the coding of a regime transition. Given these rules, the GWF measure is not simply a measure of change in levels of democracy nor is it a measure limited to change only in the formal institutions, which may or may not have any real influence on the government of a state (Geddes, Wright & Frantz 2014 p. 314-315). For this reason, the GWF measure improves on Polity-based measures in two important ways. First, because GWF attempt to measure *general* institutional change rather than change in levels of democracy, this measure captures a significant number of regime changes that do not result in a major shift along the Polity scale. Second, because the GWF measure takes into account both formal and de facto rules regarding leader selection and the exercise of

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[19]I use a version of this measure published in the CHISOLS dataset for longer temporal coverage.

power, this measure excludes many false positives that appear in the Polity measure. Using the data provided by Geddes, Wright, and Franzt, I construct the variable *Regime Change*, which takes the value "1" in any rivalry-year in which one or both rivals undergo regime change and "0" otherwise. Regime change occurs in approximately 9% of rival-years.

I also replicate two measures that have been used in previous works on rivalry termination. Irregular changes in leadership (Dreyer 2011) and SOLS changes (Rooney, 2018) have previously been used in studies of rivalry termination to proxy for changes in policy and governing preferences. I follow these studies in constructing variables *Irregular Transition* and *SOLS Change*. For *Irregular Transition* I follow Dreyer's example in using ARCHIGOS (Goemans et al., 2009) to construct a variable that takes the value "1" in any year in which either rival experiences an irregular leader entry into office. I also use the CHISOLS dataset (Mattes et al., 2016) to construct a variable that takes the value "1" in any year in which either of the rivals experiences a SOLS change as defined by CHISOLS.

The GWF regimes dataset and CHISOLS both use the list of leader transitions contained in ARCHIGOS as a starting point from which they then apply their separate coding rules. As such, using the three datasets in conjunction ensures that the findings presented below do not result simply from systematic differences in coding the effective date of leader, support coalition and regime transitions. Neither regime change nor SOLS change are a subset of the other variable. 259 cases exist in which regime change and SOLS change occur simultaneously. However, 32.5% of regime changes –124 cases in this dataset –and 60% of SOLS change –389 cases –occur in isolation.

War and Exogenous Regime Change: I employ dummy variables to capture the effect of decisive war and forced regime change on rivalry termination. A decisive war or a forced regime change should be expected to influence both the end of a rivalry as well as domestic politics. Thus, these occurrences must be controlled for to prevent conflating the effect of military victory with the effect of domestic changes. I create the variable *Decisive War* using

the COW Interstate Wars Dataset (Sarkees et al. 2010). This variable takes the value "1" in the year in which a war between the rivals ends in a victory for either side and "0' otherwise. The second variable *Foreign Imposition* is constructed using the ARCHIGOS dataset. The variable *Foreign Imposition* takes the value "1" for any year in which ARCHIGOS codes that a foreign imposed leader enters office or a leader was removed by foreign intervention.

Civil War: Civil wars are associated with rivalry termination (Diehl and Goertz, 2001; Goertz and Diehl, 1995). I control for ongoing civil war using the Correlates of War Intrastate Wars (v4.1) dataset (Sarkees et al., 2010) to construct a variable that takes the value "1" in any year in which either rival experiences civil war and "0" otherwise.

Military Capabilities: Loss of military competitiveness is cited as a major explanation of rivalry termination (Rasler et al., 2013; Thompson & Dreyer 2011). As such, I include a measure of the balance of power between rivals in my model that captures the disparity in rivals' Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972). This variable is measured as the largest CINC score in the dyad divided by the sum of CINC scores in the dyad.

System Shocks: Previous research has shown that major disruptions of the world system end some rivalries while starting others (Owsiak & Rider, 2013; Diehl and Goertz, 2001; Goertz and Diehl, 1995). As such, I control for the occurrence of shocks to the international system using the measure developed by Goertz and Diehl (1995).[20]

Contiguity: Finally, states located physically closer to one another should be expected to have relatively more intense disputes and to have a relatively easier time maintaining military competition, *ceteres paribus*. I control for physical proximity using the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity (V3.2) dataset (Stinnett et al., 2002). This variable takes the value "1" for any observation in which the rivals in question share a land or river border, or are separated

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[20]However, I use the version of this measure that appears in Owsiak and Rider's (2013) replication data due to its longer temporal domain.

by less than 400 nautical miles of water.

Results

Table 1 displays the result of a series of Cox models fit on these data. The table displays hazard ratios rather than raw coefficients. Hazard ratios below 1 indicate variables that are associated with a decrease in the hazard of rivalry termination while hazard ratios above 1 indicate an increase in the hazard of rivalry termination as compared to the baseline hazard function. I find, consistent with previous research, that a number of factors have significant influence over rivalry termination. Increasing power disparity between two rivals leads to a substantively large increase in the hazard of rivalry termination in the next period. Interestingly, coefficients associated with the interaction between capability disparities and the log of the time variable are significantly smaller than 1 indicating that the importance of power disparities in determining rivalry termination may be diminishing as time progresses. A similar pattern is seen when examining the effect of a decisive war outcome between the rivals. A decisive war increases the subsequent hazard of rivalry termination by an order of magnitude, however the importance of war to explaining rivalry termination also appears to be diminishing with time. These findings indicate that, while regime change plays an important role –that I will discuss at length below –it should not be thought to be the dominant or only factor in determining rivalry termination. War, power differentials and shocks to the international system all play an important, if possibly diminishing, role in rivalry outcomes.[21]

In turning to my core analysis, I begin by noting Models 1 and 2, which display the effect of leader and preference change on rivalry termination when omitting regime change. In both cases, the effect is positive and distinguishable from zero. This finding is consistent with previous analyses of domestic shocks and rivalry termination (Rooney 2018, Dreyer

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[21]However, we should be careful about comparing effect sizes of a focal variable and control variables as the latter may be biased by omitted variables (see Keele, Stevenson & Elwert 2020 for a discussion of the difficulties inherent in interpreting control coefficients.)

2012). However, upon including an institutions-based measure of regime change in the model (Models 3 & 4) both SOLS change and irregular leader turnover are associated with no effect on rivalry termination. In models 3 & 4, regime change has a large and statistically significant effect, increasing the hazard that rivalry will terminate in the next period by between 5.0 and 5.4 times the baseline rate. This seems to indicate that previous findings relating change in leaders and change in the sources of leader support to rivalry termination result largely from omitted variable bias.

I more thoroughly address this possibility that previous findings have been due to omitted variable bias in Tables 8 and 9 in the appendix. Table 8 displays a direct replication of Rooney's 2018 main finding, which shows a strong link between SOLS change and rivalry termination. In Table 9, I make one change. I replace the Polity *durable* variable that is used in the original model with the more credible GWF measure. As I would expect, SOLS change has no discernible effect on rivalry termination when accounting for institutional change. Regime change, however, significantly increases the hazard of rivalry termination. As noted by Wright and Bak (2016), the Polity IV *durable* variable fails to capture a number of major changes to institutions governing leader selection and policy formation (p.2). These uncounted institutional changes remain as an excluded variable in previous analyses and bias findings through their correlation with leadership and SOLS change.

These initial findings provide strong support for hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the effect of preference and institutional change on rivalry termination. Table 8 in the online appendix lists the 38 rivalries during the 1919-2010 time period that end within 5 years of a regime change in one state of the pair. These 38 rivalries account for one third (32.8%) of rivalry terminations during this time period. 28 of these rivalries –just under one quarter of the total (24%) –terminate within 2 years of regime change in one state. As noted above regime change may not be the dominant factory in rivalry termination, but in accounting for up to 1/3 of rivalry terminations, it does seem to be one major influence.

Substantively these findings suggest that, as was the case in the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union, changes in leadership and leaders' preferences regarding policy seem to have little influence on the likelihood that rivals will settle their disputes. These preference changes may lead to a temporary thaw in relations, but preference changes are not sufficient to end a rivalry. In contrast, changes to the institutional structure of a regime have a large substantive effect; making subsequent dispute settlement and rivalry termination much more likely. This holds true not only for cases where rivals dispute primarily over matters of policy or ideology, but also for positional and spatial rivalries as well. Table 2 displays the results of models fit on three subsets of rivalry including positional rivalries (those where disputes center around position in the global or regional ordering of power), spatial rivalries (those where disputes center around territory), and ideological rivalries (those where disputes center around policy disagreements or the incompatibility of governing ideologies).[22] Consistent with previous findings (Dreyer, 2012) regime change has the largest effect in ending ideological rivalries. However, where Dreyer finds irregular leader turnover to end only ideological rivalries, regime change also plays a significant role in ending positional and spatial rivalries as well.

Models 5 and 6 in the main table include interactions between regime change and the measures of leader and preference change, which are necessary to test hypothesis 3. Model 5 and 6 show that SOLS change and irregular leader turnover have no discernible independent effect on rivalry termination. Regime change does have an independent effect on termination. This indicates that regime change, on its own, is sufficient to promote dispute resolutions between rivals where leader and coalition change are not. As expected in hypothesis 3, the effect of regime change on rivalry termination increases significantly when occurring in conjunction with a change in leader preferences.

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[22]For the ideological rivalry subset in Table 4, I combine Thompson and Dreyer's Ideological and Interventionary rivalries into one category representing rivals that dispute largely over policy stances.

Figure 1 displays the substantive effects of regime change and preference change on the likelihood of rivalry survival based on the Cox regression in Model 5. SOLS changes alone do not lead to rivalry termination at a greater rate than the baseline, and may in fact be associated with longer-lasting rivalries. Regime change, however, has a large independent effect, leading to a much shorter subsequent period of rivalry. The conjunction of both regime and SOLS change has an additional heightened effect in decreasing the length of a rivalry. Taken together these findings indicate changes in leader and coalition do not, on their own, contribute significantly to the likelihood that rivals will subsequently resolve their disputes. Rather, the only domestic shock that seems to influence rivalry termination is significant rewriting of a state's institutions.

Previous research has shown that democratization is associated with rivalry termination (Prins & Daxecker, 2008). Given this previous finding, a detailed examination of whether the type of regime change –transition to democracy, democratic breakdown, or transition from one autocratic regime to another –leads to different dispute-resolution outcomes is warranted. Table 3 displays a model in which I segregated regime change into three separate dummy variables. The first represents cases in which one autocratic regime is replaced by another autocratic regime. The second dummy represents cases in which a nominally democratic government is consolidated into an autocratic regime. The final dummy represents transitions from autocracy to democracy. All three are associated with a statistically significant increase in the hazard of rivalry termination. As previous research would lead us to expect, transitions to democracy have the largest effect, increasing the hazard that a rivalry terminates in the following period by an order of magnitude. However, in contrast to what previous research would lead us to expect, transitions from democracy to autocracy and from autocracy to autocracy are also both associated with a large increase in the hazard of rivalry termination of $\sim 500\%$ in each case. Table 8 displays a list of the 38 rivalries that end within 5 years after a regime change during the 1919-2010 time period. Examination of the pre and post change

mix of regimes in the dyad also seems to reveal no clear pattern as to which direction of change or final regime mix should be thought to be primarily responsible for ending rivalry. Given this, we should conclude that it is regime change itself that ends rivalry, not only democratization, autocratization or changes to a shared regime type that matter.

Conclusion

Previous research has consistently shown that changes in the domestic politics of one rival are associated with subsequent rivalry termination. Despite this, little work has been done to disentangle the effects of different forms of political change on rivalry. In this paper I demonstrate that the effect of domestic political change on rivalry depends on the type of change, and the extent to which the change provides other rivals with certainty that attempts at dispute resolution will be reciprocated. Changes in leaders and winning coalitions represent moments of political instability, but do not necessarily represent a major departure from previous policy stances and are easily reversed. This provides little certainty that the rival will not defect from a cooperative path in the future. However, fundamental changes in the institutions governing leader selection and policy formation provide a high degree of certainty that a state's future policy will depart from past stances. This fundamental shift eliminates much of the perception of risk that other leaders face when considering dispute resolution, leaving only the benefits associated with making peace.

These findings suggest that previous research have incorrectly conflated regime change with change in preferences and governing coalitions. These are distinct concepts. Governing coalitions can change quite rapidly within a stable institutional context and leader preferences can vary significantly over time, even within a single administration. This easy malleability means that a rival has little reason to believe that a leader's preferences toward conflict resolution will not disappear with the next administration or even with the next news cycle. Institutions, in general, are harder to change than are leaders and their opinions. Thus, when there is a major rewrite of a state's governing institutions, it provides the rival with a far

higher degree of certainty that subsequent movements toward a cooperative policy will not be reversed in the future. This makes conflict resolution possible in the face of risk-averse attitudes born from the fear that one's overtures of peace will be taken advantage of by a rival.

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Main Tables and Figures

Table 1: Cox Regression with Non-Proportional Hazards: Rivalry Termination 1919-2010

	(1) Hazard Ratio b/se	(2) Hazard Ratio b/se	(3) Hazard Ratio b/se	(4) Hazard Ratio b/se	(5) Hazard Ratio b/se	(6) Hazard Ratio b/se
Regime Change			5.0886***	5.4416***	3.9512***	5.5935***
			1.5484	1.7063	1.4440	1.7785
Regime Change × SOLS Change					5.7286***	
					1.7131	
Regime Change × Irregular Turnover						4.8502***
						1.6405
SOLS Change	2.0026**		1.0507		0.7862	
	0.5044		0.2852		0.3500	
Irregular Turnover		2.1167*		0.9126		1.0300
		0.6757		0.3133		0.7013
Civil War	1.3360	1.3510	1.3225	1.3374	1.3011	1.3443
	0.3173	0.3238	0.3224	0.3318	0.3168	0.3301
Foreign Imposition	7.2404***	7.0705***	2.7187**	2.6643**	2.8659**	2.6477**
	2.2781	2.4241	0.9929	0.9796	1.0286	0.9773
Joint IGO Membership	1.0519+	1.0445	1.0405	1.0395	1.0368	1.0394
	0.0292	0.0292	0.0303	0.0302	0.0309	0.0302
Joint IGO X Log(t)	0.9899	0.9924	0.9930	0.9932	0.9942	0.9932
	0.0079	0.0079	0.0082	0.0082	0.0085	0.0082
Capability Disparity	966.1865**	1719.6770**	491.6583**	494.9880**	528.7628**	507.0574**
	2278.6763	3987.2079	1136.8829	1141.0845	1220.4872	1172.8447
Cap. Ratio X Log(t)	0.1225**	0.1047***	0.1385**	0.1378**	0.1346**	0.1365**
	0.0832	0.0706	0.0918	0.0908	0.0895	0.0905
Decisive War	45.2897**	41.3970**	33.8920**	33.5844**	36.7915**	32.7807*
	55.2390	51.2703	45.9176	45.7797	50.0895	45.5090
Decisive War X Log(t)	0.4689*	0.4914*	0.4599*	0.4583*	0.4532*	0.4609*
	0.1520	0.1629	0.1689	0.1701	0.1670	0.1742
Contiguity	0.3898	0.3257	0.3753	0.3742	0.3834	0.3697
	0.5720	0.4579	0.5564	0.5541	0.5694	0.5511
Contiguity X Log(t)	1.3756	1.4484	1.3703	1.3703	1.3513	1.3758
	0.5602	0.5683	0.5623	0.5628	0.5611	0.5692
Systemic Shock	17.7384**	16.8974*	14.0887**	13.7274**	15.2979**	13.7113**
	19.2812	18.6343	14.4496	13.9354	15.5080	13.8867
Systemic Shock X Log(t)	0.4432**	0.4447**	0.4643**	0.4680**	0.4571**	0.4678**
	0.1356	0.1382	0.1343	0.1339	0.1311	0.1336
coldwar	0.4099	0.3493	0.3121	0.3145	0.3337	0.3125
	0.3908	0.3367	0.2954	0.2935	0.3129	0.2905
Cold War X Log(t)	1.3136	1.3442	1.3633	1.3607	1.3300	1.3638
	0.3829	0.3958	0.3963	0.3910	0.3827	0.3917
Observations	3907	3907	3907	3907	3907	3907

Exponentiated coefficients

Rivalry-clustered standard errors

$+p < 0.10$, $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions

Table 2: Cox Regression: Regime-Change and Rivalry Termination by Type 1919-2010

	(Positional Rivalry) Hazard Ratio exp(se)	(Spatial Rivalry) Hazard Ratio exp(se)	(Ideological Rivalry) Hazard Ratio exp(se)
Regime Change	4.4161***	3.6795***	10.6029***
	1.9928	1.1905	5.3199
Civil War	0.9435	0.9373	1.5021
	0.3893	0.2940	0.6039
Foreign Imposition	4.3842*	5.4992**	7.5166*
	2.6000	2.8579	7.2425
Joint IGO Membership	1.0943*	1.0673+	1.0675
	0.0441	0.0357	0.0782
Joint IGO X Logt(t)	0.9779*	0.9838+	0.9870
	0.0104	0.0094	0.0247
Capability Disparity	14168.9100*	139.3651+	85.5038
	56147.8685	410.1277	457.6308
Cap. Ratio X Log(t)	0.0602*	0.1872*	0.2118
	0.0724	0.1552	0.3889
Decisive War	1.1373	152.8962***	1636.1516*
	1.9079	213.7825	4899.6790
Decisive War X Log(t)	1.1038	0.3411**	0.0994+
	0.5106	0.1287	0.1246
Contiguity	0.0202+	35.8257	1.8833
	0.0407	130.8663	4.1258
Contiguity X Log(t)	3.0793+	0.4332	0.4067
	1.8128	0.3862	0.3012
Systemic Shock	92.4151*	10.9590*	9.5345
	178.3135	13.2065	13.1690
Systemic Shock X Log(t)	0.3113*	0.4745*	0.7181
	0.1627	0.1539	0.3362
coldwar	0.4700	0.0462*	1.6216
	0.6887	0.0713	2.6155
Cold War X Log(t)	1.3963	2.2518+	1.0436
	0.6322	0.9824	0.5964
Observations	2152	2724	1324

Exponentiated coefficients

Rivalry-clustered standard errors

$+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

Table 3: Cox Regression: Regime-Change Type and Rivalry Termination 1919-2010

	Hazard Ratio exp(se)
Transition Autoc. to Autoc.	3.1409*
	1.5973
Transition to Autoc.	4.6417**
	2.4035
Transition to Democ.	10.4904***
	3.7643
Civil War	1.2163
	0.2988
Foreign Imposition	1.2871
	0.6238
Joint IGO Membership	1.0463
	0.0304
Joint IGO X Log(t)	0.9922
	0.0083
Capability Disparity	363.3324**
	819.7241
Cap. Ratio X Log(t)	0.1563**
	0.1001
Decisive War	28.8743*
	37.8203
Decisive War X Log(t)	0.4823*
	0.1696
Contiguity	0.4956
	0.7247
Contiguity X Log(t)	1.2639
	0.5078
Systemic Shock	14.9631*
	15.9876
Systemic Shock X Log(t)	0.4641*
	0.1401
coldwar	0.3615
	0.3421
Cold War X Log(t)	1.3528
	0.3948
Observations	3907

Exponentiated coefficients

Rivalry-clustered standard errors

$+ p < 0.10$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

Appendix A:

Table 4: Testing the Proportional Hazards Assumption

	Regime Change	SOLS Change	Civil War	Foreign Imposition	Capability Disparity	Decisive War	Contiguity	Systemic Shock	Cold War	Joint IGO
	b/p	b/p	b/p	b/p	b/p	b/p	b/p	b/p	b/p	b/p
Interaction	0.9335	0.7004	0.8502	1.1337	0.0911	0.4015	0.6228	0.3956	1.7570	0.9878
	0.8083	0.1066	0.5076	0.7791	0.0000	0.0011	0.0773	0.0000	0.0547	0.0504
Regime Change	7.3965*	5.6110***	6.0247***	6.0012***	5.1891***	5.9019***	5.6991***	5.4361***	6.3534***	5.8332***
	0.0173	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
SOLS Change	0.9291	3.1223	0.9364	0.9474	0.9827	0.9206	0.9654	1.0776	0.9386	0.9701
	0.7843	0.1516	0.8074	0.8483	0.9487	0.7599	0.8967	0.7699	0.8138	0.9108
Civil War	1.4843	1.4622	2.5158	1.4977	1.3942	1.5389+	1.3867	1.2642	1.5253+	1.4586
	0.1176	0.1292	0.2434	0.1139	0.1833	0.0891	0.1964	0.3339	0.0970	0.1360
Foreign Imposition	3.5778***	3.4492***	3.5013***	2.4087	2.8727**	3.0838**	3.7083***	3.6968***	3.1899***	3.7056***
	0.0003	0.0003	0.0003	0.5409	0.0020	0.0016	0.0002	0.0004	0.0009	0.0002
Capability Disparity	1.6355	1.5553	1.6328	1.6695	1904.3418***	1.5440	1.3118	1.0472	1.6083	1.5463
	0.5456	0.5892	0.5457	0.5296	0.0000	0.5936	0.7395	0.9525	0.5550	0.5889
Decisive War	2.4557*	2.4464*	2.4541*	2.4842*	2.6314**	58.6730***	2.3731*	2.3208*	2.5354*	2.4359*
	0.0232	0.0231	0.0260	0.0241	0.0061	0.0001	0.0300	0.0460	0.0145	0.0231
Joint IGO Membership	1.0288***	1.0291***	1.0287***	1.0286***	1.0194*	1.0274***	1.0259***	1.0235**	1.0271***	1.0686**
	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0161	0.0003	0.0008	0.0019	0.0003	0.0033
Contiguity	1.0764	1.0516	1.0730	1.0840	0.9958	1.0836	5.6246	1.1938	1.1023	1.1063
	0.8606	0.9051	0.8682	0.8487	0.9916	0.8381	0.1076	0.6911	0.8169	0.8096
Systemic Shock	0.9334	0.9795	0.9311	0.9259	1.0861	0.8954	1.0594	24.6680***	0.8824	0.9773
	0.8306	0.9487	0.8270	0.8137	0.7808	0.7273	0.8569	0.0001	0.6970	0.9433
Cold War	0.8785	0.8776	0.8739	0.8740	0.7106	0.8461	0.8449	0.9634	0.1540*	0.8890
	0.6836	0.6778	0.6743	0.6782	0.2643	0.5883	0.6019	0.9039	0.0375	0.7092
Observations	3907	3907	3907	3907	3907	3907	3907	3907	3907	3907

Exponentiated coefficients

Rivalry clustered standard errors

Bold font indicates variables that violate the proportional hazards assumption ($p < 0.05$).

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Table 5: Cox Regression: Rivalry Termination 1919-2010 - Dropping all rivalries starting prior to 1919

	(1) Hazard Ratio exp(se)	(2) Hazard Ratio exp(se)	(3) Hazard Ratio exp(se)	(4) Hazard Ratio exp(se)
Regime Change	2.9666**	3.4788**	2.6820*	3.9595**
	1.1812	1.5077	1.2586	1.7249
Regime Change × SOLS Change			5.7549***	
			1.9841	
Regime Change × Irregular Turnover				5.9926***
				2.2712
SOLS Change	1.9061+		1.7449	
	0.6725		0.8890	
Irregular Turnover		1.8599		2.9123
		0.9012		2.1049
Civil War	1.1623	1.0814	1.1499	1.1286
	0.2964	0.3064	0.2959	0.3226
Foreign Imposition	3.1491**	3.3211**	3.2076**	3.1532*
	1.3226	1.5241	1.3409	1.4447
Joint IGO Membership	1.0574	1.0597	1.0575	1.0593
	0.0585	0.0593	0.0583	0.0598
Joint IGO X Log(t)	0.9844	0.9842	0.9844	0.9843
	0.0182	0.0183	0.0182	0.0184
Capability Disparity	62.3641	69.0237	61.3590	67.0825
	262.3085	291.5962	257.5181	282.6055
Cap. Ratio X Log(t)	0.1697	0.1631	0.1718	0.1640
	0.2537	0.2457	0.2560	0.2463
Decisive War	40081.3730***	35884.5207***	40715.8992***	38065.7476***
	125094.5467	108068.0137	129191.0870	114239.3344
Decisive War X Log(t)	0.0182**	0.0193**	0.0181**	0.0187**
	0.0246	0.0244	0.0249	0.0235
Contiguity	0.2207	0.2452	0.2202	0.2320
	0.2828	0.3046	0.2826	0.2868
Contiguity X Log(t)	1.7350	1.6873	1.7355	1.7128
	0.8157	0.7742	0.8173	0.7843
Systemic Shock	3.9139	4.0659	4.1562	3.8723
	5.0836	5.3103	5.6398	5.0833
Systemic Shock X Log(t)	0.7117	0.6966	0.6982	0.7064
	0.3437	0.3364	0.3517	0.3428
COld War	1.0147	0.9744	1.0551	0.9382
	1.1350	1.1638	1.1976	1.1119
COld War X Log(t)	0.7037	0.6982	0.6950	0.7051
	0.3001	0.3171	0.3016	0.3189
Observations	1459	1459	1459	1459

Exponentiated coefficients

Rivalry-clustered standard errors

$*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

Table 6: Cox Proportional Hazards: Rivalry Termination 1919-2010

	(1) Hazard Ratio exp(se)	(2) Hazard Ratio exp(se)	(3) Hazard Ratio exp(se)	(4) Hazard Ratio exp(se)
Regime Change	7.1385***	8.1680***	6.5080***	8.4481***
	2.1440	2.3766	2.1836	2.4242
Regime Change × SOLS Change			6.5416***	
			1.9781	
Regime Change × Irregular Turnover				4.7523***
				1.7336
SOLS Change	0.8856		0.7853	
	0.2457		0.3545	
Irregular Turnover		0.6038		0.7178
		0.2103		0.5154
Civil War	1.6217+	1.6621*	1.6060+	1.6756*
	0.4091	0.4152	0.4081	0.4128
Foreign Imposition	3.0172***	3.0814***	3.0669***	3.0809***
	0.9989	0.9793	1.0106	0.9772
Capability Disparity	1.6219	1.4916	1.6079	1.4932
	1.2987	1.1946	1.2949	1.1957
Joint IGO Membership	1.3792	1.2697	1.4311	1.2509
	0.6691	0.5921	0.7046	0.5885
Decisive War	1.8930	1.8154	1.8919	1.8185
	0.7596	0.7091	0.7646	0.7067
Contiguity	1.3883	1.3697	1.3725	1.3767
	0.5636	0.5416	0.5695	0.5424
Systemic Shock	0.7696	0.8004	0.7779	0.7960
	0.2390	0.2451	0.2444	0.2418
Cold War	0.7971	0.8351	0.7926	0.8376
	0.2620	0.2687	0.2604	0.2716
Observations	3909	3909	3909	3909

Exponentiated coefficients

Rivalry-clustered standard errors

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

Table 7: Rivalries Ending Within 5 Years of Regime Change: 1919-2010

Rivalry	State A	State B	End Year	Starting Regime Mix	Preceding Regime	Succeeding Regime	Change State	Ending Regime Mix
29	Russia	China	1949	WL/SP	Warlord	Single-Party	China	SP/SP
34	Brazil	Argentina	1980	D/Junt	Democracy	Junta	Argentina	Junt/Junt
37	Columbia	Peru	1934	D/Pers	Personalist	Military	Peru	D/Military
47	El Salvador	Honduras	1993	D/Hyb	Hybrid	Democracy	Honudras	D/D
48	Guatemala	Honduras	1933	D/Junt	Junta	Personalist	Guatemala	D/Pers
52	Chile	Argentina	1984	Junt/Junt	Junta	Democracy	Argentina	D/Junt
63	Japan	Russia	1956	Junt/SP	Junta	Democracy	Japan	D/SP
64	Greece	Bulgaria	1974	Junt/SP	Junta	Democracy	Greece	D/SP
66	Bulgaria	Romania	1940	Mon/Mon	Monarchy	Junta	Romania	Mon/Junt
71	Ethiopia	Italy	1943	Mon/Pers	Personalist	Other	Italy	Mon/Junt
73	Bolivia	Paraguay	1938	Olig/Olig	Oligarchy	Junta	Bolivia	Olig/Junt
82	Hungary	Romania	1947	Junta/SP	Junta	Single-Party	Romania	SP/SP
89	Costa Rica	Panama	1941	D/Pers	Personalist	Hybrid	Panama	D/Hyb
120	Thailand	Vietnam	1991	SP/SP	Single-Party	Junta	Thailand	SP/Junt
126	Russia	China	1992	SP/SP	Single-Party	Personalist	Russia	SP/Pers
129	Mali	Burkina-Faso	1986	Pers/Junta	Junta	Personalist	Burkina-Faso	Pers/Pers
131	Ghana	Ivory Coast	1966	SP/SP	Single-Party	Junta	Ghana	Junt/SP
132	Ghana	Nigeria	1972	Junt/Hyb	Hybrid	Junta	Ghana	Junt/D
139	Burundi	Rwanda	1973	WL/SP	Single-Party	Junta	Rwanda	WL/Junta
140	Indonesia	Malaysia	1966	D/Pers	Personalist	Junta	Indonesia	D/Junta
142	Sudan	Uganda	1974	Per/Per	Personalist	Personalist	Uganda	Pers/Pers
143	Chad	Sudan	1975	Per/SP	Single-Party	Junta	Chad	Per/Junta
144	Malawi	Tanzania	1994	Pers/SP	Personalist	Democracy	Malawi	D/SP
149	Rhodesia	Zambia	1979	SP/D	Democracy	Single-Party	Rhodesia	SP/SP
150	South Africa	Zambia	1992	SP/Olig	Single-Party	Hybrid	Zambia	Hybrid/Olig
151	Chad	Libya	1994	Pers/Pers	Personalist	Personalist	Chad	Pers/Pers
160	Libya	Sudan	1985	Pers/Hybrid	Hybrid	Democracy	Sudan	Pers/D
161	Congo (DRC)	Angola	1997	SP/Hybrid	Hybrid	Personalist	Congo	SP/Pers
163	Cameroon	Nigeria	2002	Pers/Junta	Junta	Other	Nigeria	Pers/Other
164	Mozambique	Rhodesia	1979	SP/D	Democracy	Single-Party	Rhodesia	SP/SP
165	Cambodia	Vietnam	1979	SP/SP	Single-Party	Single-Party	Cambodia	SP/SP
166	Mozambique	South Africa	1993	SP/D	Democracy	Oligarchy	South Africa	SP/Olig
172	South Africa	Zimbabwe	1993	SP/D	Democracy	Oligarchy	South Africa	SP/Olig
173	Belize	Guatemala	2000	D/Junt	Junta	Democracy	Guatemala	D/D
177	Kenya	Sudan	1994	SP/D	Democracy	Personalist	Sudan	SP/Pers
192	Congo (DRC)	Rwanda	2009	SP/Pers	Personalist	Democracy	Congo (DRC)	SP/D
193	Congo (DRC)	Uganda	2009	Pers/Pers	Personalist	Democracy	Congo (DRC)	Pers/D

Hybrid regimes are defined as those that mix democratic and autocratic characteristics.

Table 8: Direct Replication of Rooney 2018

	(1) Year T	(2) Year T	(3) 2 Years	(4) 3 Years
Source of Leader Support Change	2.129***	2.620**	2.781**	3.200***
	(0.590)	(1.134)	(1.244)	(1.411)
Regime Transition (Polity)	2.068**	3.102**	3.117**	2.554*
	(0.755)	(1.399)	(1.558)	(1.294)
Contiguity		0.295***	0.274***	0.272***
		(0.111)	(0.0927)	(0.0991)
Probability of Stalemate		14.75	0.290	90569.9
		(62.73)	(1.195)	(779890.7)
Past MIDs		0.963	0.985	0.983
		(0.0267)	(0.0304)	(0.0311)
Peace Years		0.997	0.995*	0.996*
		(0.00237)	(0.00243)	(0.00242)
Non-Rival MIDs		0.714**	0.810*	0.812*
		(0.0992)	(0.0883)	(0.0879)
Joint Democracy		1.102	1.471	1.931
		(0.653)	(1.252)	(1.844)
Joint IGO Memberships		1.032*	1.044***	1.036**
		(0.0159)	(0.0159)	(0.0158)
Ln(Trade)		0.873	0.941	0.964
		(0.0749)	(0.0738)	(0.0742)
Observations	3474	1822	1536	1448

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.

All models are clustered on the dyad and include region fixed effects.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 9: Replication of Rooney 2018 with GWF Regime Change Variable

	(1) Year T	(2) Year T	(3) 2 Years	(4) 3 Years
Source of Leader Support Change	1.169	1.455	1.291	1.681
	(0.350)	(0.485)	(0.566)	(0.723)
Regime Change (GWF)	4.888***	5.390***	4.856***	3.710***
	(1.393)	(2.282)	(2.159)	(1.741)
Contiguity		0.277***	0.267***	0.269***
		(0.100)	(0.0941)	(0.0990)
Probability of Stalemate		233.2	8.826	337287.4
		(1168.1)	(34.08)	(3112297.1)
Past MIDs		0.968	1.004	1.001
		(0.0248)	(0.0329)	(0.0339)
Peace Years		0.998	0.997	0.997
		(0.00237)	(0.00254)	(0.00251)
Non-Rival MIDs		0.716**	0.798**	0.797**
		(0.0949)	(0.0825)	(0.0820)
Joint Democracy		1.673	2.142	2.464
		(0.968)	(2.016)	(2.454)
Joint IGO Memberships		1.027	1.039**	1.033**
		(0.0166)	(0.0161)	(0.0160)
Ln(Trade)		0.892	0.973	0.990
		(0.0720)	(0.0740)	(0.0751)
Observations	3474	1822	1536	1448

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.

All models are clustered on the dyad and include region fixed effects.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$