Regime Change and the Management of Territorial Disputes

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Introduction

How do changes in the domestic politics of a state effect escalation and deescalation of hostilities in territorial disputes? Territorial disputes account for a disproportionate number of interstate wars. Vasquez and Henehan find that roughly 60% of all wars stem from an underlying territorial dispute (2001). Further, territorial disputes are more likely to escalate to war than are disputes over policy disagreements or regime (Vasquez & Henehan, 2001; Senese & Vasquez, 2003; Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001). Recent conflicts, such as the Russian annexation of Crimea in response to the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, suggest that major shocks to the domestic politics of one state can motivate the outbreak of violence over territory even in the case of a largely dormant dispute. While in other cases like the Itaipu/Parana dispute between Argentine and Brazil, regime changes –such as Videla's 1976 coup in Argentina –serve rather to reduce tensions over the disputed region. However, despite the centrality of territorial issues to international conflict and the known importance of major changes in domestic politics to causing and maintaining international disputes (Maoz, 1989; Walt 1997; Colgan, 2009; 2010; Colgan & Weeks, 2015; Saunders, 2021), researchers have largely ignored the effects of changing domestic politics when studying questions of escalation and deescalation in territorial disputes.

Extant explanations of territorial dispute escalation focus primarily on static factors. Preexisting historical boundaries coordinate behavior in the border region as well as providing leaders with justification for territorial claims, both of which reduce the cost that leaders expect to pay for pursuing a territorial claim (Abramson & Carter, 2016; Carter & Goemans, 2011). This provides little insight into why these time-invariant historical boundaries become contentious at some times when at other times the modern boundaries lie unchallenged. Similarly, the discovery of valuable resources on a piece of land may explain the onset of a territorial claim (Hensel, 2001), but does little to explain why these same territorial claims often lie dormant for decades at a time, while at other times are especially salient drivers

of militarized disputes. I argue that an explanation based on large changes to the domestic political environment of one state –such as regime change –that lead to significant changes to that state's relationship with others in the international system explain the escalation and deescalation of ongoing disputes better than existing theories.

Domestic shocks like regime change disrupt the status quo. When relations between countries are friendly, regime change increases hostility. When relations between countries are unfriendly, regime change decreases hostility. These shocks have been shown to: (1) disrupt trade (Bobick & Smith, 2013; McGillivray & Smith, 2004), (2) reduce FDI flows (Bobick & Smith, 2013) and (3) lead to the abrogation of alliance agreements (Siverson & Starr, 1994; Leeds et al., 2009). However, the domestic shocks that can sever existing ties and disrupt friendly relations have also been shown to *improve unfriendly* pre-existing relations. Regime change leads to the (4) creation of new security ties where none existed (Siverson & Starr, 1994), (5) the resolution of ongoing trade disputes, and (6) the restoration of trade ties where relations had previously turned sour (Bobick & Smith, 2013).

In the case of disputed territory, trade and security ties serve to distribute the value of a disputed piece of territory. Thus, disrupting these ties will threaten to cut off the claimant state from a share of the benefit to be had from the disputed territory. This provides increased incentive to seize the territory by force as a means of accessing and securing the economic or strategic value of that territory. Thus we would expect the leadership of the claimant state to take action to seize claimed territory in the wake of changes that disrupt pre-existing economic and security relationships between the disputants. But when domestic shocks lead to the anticipation of improved relations in terms of trade, FDI and security cooperation, these expected new ties would serve to distribute a share of the value of a disputed territory to the claimant thus providing a benefit to the claimant state. In such a case the claimant anticipates that improved relations with the target state will lead to greater satisfaction with the status quo arrangement of territory, and is subsequently less likely to press the claim by

military means.

Thus, when regime change occurs in one state of a dyad that has previously held friendly relations despite their disputed territory, we should expect to see a subsequent increase in hostility related to that territorial dispute. When regime change occurs in a dyad where hostility levels were previously higher, we should expect to see regime change lead to a reduction in subsequent hostility. This expectation runs counter to previous explanations of the link between domestic shocks and conflict. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 provides a

I test this argument in a dataset consisting of 53 ongoing territorial disputes during the years 1945-2001 and find evidence to support the claim that domestic political shocks have a conditional effect on the subsequent level of hostility in a dispute that is conditioned on the extent to which states share a friendly relationship *ex-ante*. When parties to a territorial dispute have relatively friendly relations –sharing significant economic and/or security ties -an instance of regime change in one state leads to a subsequent increase in the probability of militarized conflict that is up to 3.5 times greater than the base rate in the sample. However, when the disputants are relatively unfriendly prior to regime change in one, the probability of a subsequent militarized incident declines significantly –to approximate zero in some cases –following the regime change. The findings of this analysis have important implications for future research into the effects of domestic politics on interactions between states. Most research into the effects of domestic political shocks presents the reader with uni-directional hypotheses. Domestic shocks are argued to lead either to an increase in the variable of interest or to a decrease depending on the core theoretical insight of the researcher. The findings presented here, however, demonstrate that the effects of a domestic political shock are conditional on the *ex-ante* relationship between states. This suggests that going forward, when researchers theorize a link between changing domestic political conditions and subsequent change in dyadic relationships, that they should take care to understand the

pre-existing relationships between states and how these existing relationships may lead to heterogeneous outcomes *ex-post.*

Escalation and Deescalation of Territorial Disputes

A large body of research exists to show that territorial disputes are distinctly different from other issues that states may dispute over. Territorial disputes have been shown to be very prone to escalation (Hensel, 2012; Diehl & Goertz, 2002; Senese & Vasquez, 2003; Vasquez, 2001) and once escalated are resistant to factors that motivate deescalation in other disputes (Senese, 1996). Vasquez & Henehan (2001) show that territorial disputes are almost twice as likely to end in war than are other forms of interstate dispute (127). However, within this blanket war-proneness, relatively less work has been done to understand the timing by which parties to a territorial dispute escalate to violence or alternately, when they allow the dispute to lie dormant. Democracies are shown to be both more likely to settle disputes peacefully and less likely to escalate them to violence (Huth & Allee, 2002). In a similar track, Chiozza and Choi (2003) show that regime type and the length of a leader's tenure in office interact to effect escalation and deescalation of territorial disputes. New autocrats and long-serving democrats are shown to resolve disputes more often while new democrats and long-service autocrats are seen to escalate disputes to violence at a higher rate (266-275). Wright and Diehl (2016) show that territorial disputes in mixed-regime dyads are particularly prone to escalating to violence. Finally, territorial disputes have also been shown to be significantly more prone to escalation when a state's vital economic and security interests are at risk (Hensel et al., 2008; Huth & Allee, 2002; Huth, 2000). However, little work has been done to explain why the economic and strategic value embodied in territory are worth fighting over at some times but not others.

Shared Interests and the Management of Territorial Disputes

Much research suggests that territorial disputes can be managed through interest-sharing between states such as through trade ties (Lee & Rider 2018, Schultz 2015, Rosecrance

1986), foreign direct investment (Lee & Mitchell 2012, Rosecrance & Thompson 2003) and alliance and treaty-making (Gibler 1997, Gibler 1996). In each case, it is argued that these shared interests serve to reduce the value of territory ownership. In the absence of trade or investment, a state can only benefit from the existence of economically valuable territory by owning that territory and building extractive industry on it (for the case of valuable natural resources). In such a case, direct ownership is necessary to enjoying the economic value of that territory, and fighting to control the territory is potentially beneficial to the winner. However, trade or FDI flows between neighboring states serve to distribute the economic value of the territory. Thus when trade relations between the initiator and target of a territorial claim are relatively good, a state need not have direct ownership of the piece of territory in question to benefit from it's economic value. In such a case, the relative benefit of war to seize the territory is reduced.

The same is true in the case of security ties and military cooperation. When two states are engaged in a relationship that allows for a real possibility of war between them, ownership of strategically valuable territory located in the border region becomes a necessity to both state's national security. The state that owns the territory can attack from a position of relative security, knowing that if the attack fails the enemy must fight it's way across natural defenses before it can strike at the heartland. In this case, ownership of the territory may, itself, be worth costly warfare. However, when the states in question perceive a relatively low probability of militarized conflict between the two, direct ownership of this strategic territory becomes less salient to the state's security interests, thus is less worth the price of war (Gibler 1997, Gibler 1996).

Generally, economic or military integration between neighboring states serves to make ownership of territory less valuable and thus, less salient to domestic publics and policymakers in both states. This implies, however, that events that disrupt trade or erode the stability of military partnerships will sharply increase the value of territory ownership. Events that

end trade or investment serve to threaten the economic prosperity of the neighboring trade-partners by cutting them off from the resources and profits extracted from valuable territory. Domestic interests in the neighboring state will suffer for being cut off from the valuable territory in question and will likely push their leaders to take action –possibly military action –to restore valuable economic flows. Similarly, events that erode a military partnership between neighboring states will serve to undermine trust in peace between the two, rapidly increasing the perceived value of strategic territory in their shared borderlands.

On the opposite side, events that increase trade or bring new security partnerships into being should have the reverse effect. Events that increase trade and investment between states will help to distribute the economic value of the territory, making possession of a piece of disputed land less economically salient. Events that improve cooperation, especially in security matters, should reduce the perceived likelihood of military conflict between neighbors, and thus reduce the salience of owning strategic territory to both states' national security.

Domestic Shocks and Shared Interests

Large changes in the domestic political structure of a state (domestic shocks) have been shown to disrupt close economic and security relations between that state an others with which it shares interests in a number of ways. Leader turnover has been shown to be associated with initiation of disputes in the World Trade Organization (Bobick & Smith 2013), thus leading to disruptions in trade, and has also been found to reduce trade between the state undergoing leadership turnover and its important trade partners(McGillvray & Smith 2004). Thus we might expect that similar changes to the domestic politics of states that are party to a territorial dispute should reduce trade between the two and thus increase the importance of owning economically valuable territory.

Further, a change in a state's regime type has been associated with significant changes in a state's military partnerships (Siverson & Starr 1994) and is likely to result in the new

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regime abrogating alliance agreements (Leeds et al. 2009). Given that neighboring states are already likely to face significant uncertainty over the intentions of a newly established regime, these changes to military partnerships are likely to undermine feelings of security and trust in the continuation of peace between the change state and its neighbors, significantly heightening the perceived value of strategically useful territory.

However, when states already share few trade, investment or security ties, a domestic shock in one state has been shown to lead to improved relations between them. Bobick and Smith (2013) show that, while leadership turnover leads to the initiation of new WTO disputes in some cases, that when a trade dispute already exists between two states, leader turnover contributes to ending the dispute (p.438-441). Similarly, McGillivray and Smith (2004) show that, while leader turnover harms strong trade relationships, that when trade relations are already sour, leadership turnover can restore trade (p.588-592). This suggests that, when economic relations between two states are poor, major changes to the domestic political structure of one state can motivate the creation of new economic ties. Given that the salience of owning economically valuable territory is high in the absence of economic ties, but can be reduced by "sharing the wealth" through trade and investment, we should expect that domestic shocks that improve economic ties should reduce subsequent conflict over disputed territory.

A similar pattern holds in foreign policy and security affairs. Ratner (2009) shows that in the wake of regime transitions, a state's foreign policy alignment toward the United States is conditioned by the U.S. relationship with the previous regime. When foreign policy alignment with the previous regime is high, the succeeding regime shifts policy significantly away from U.S. preferences. But when relations between the U.S. and the previous regime were poor, transition leads to increased foreign policy alignment with the U.S (p. 406-409). Siverson and Starr (1994) demonstrate that regime change is associated not just with the severing of old alliance ties, but also with the establishment of new alliances. This changing

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alliance portfolio is likely to leave old allies feeling more concerned about the possibility of future conflict, but can reduce an old adversary's assessment of the likelihood of future war.

By disrupting trade, investment, and military ties, domestic political shocks increase the importance of territory ownership for that state and others with which it shared ties. In the case of disputed territory, these domestic shocks especially threaten to harm the economic and security interests of the state that *does not* hold direct possession of a piece of disputed territory. Severing the ties that had previously served to distribute the value of this territory increases the value of territorial ownership and can motivate militarized conflict over that territory. But because these same domestic shocks can motivate new trade, investment and security cooperation when relations were previously poor, domestic shocks can also reduce the value of direct territory ownership by creating economic ties that distribute the value of territory and by creating new security ties that reduce the importance of strategic terrain. Thus, the value of owning strategic border territory will be heightened when domestic shocks damage ties between states sharing relatively warmer relations, but these shocks can also reduce the value of owning strategic territory between states that previously had more hostile relations.

Regime Change and Territorial Disputes

I argue that regime change is a particularly influential form of domestic political shock, and regime change in a state that is party to a territorial dispute will be an especially salient driver of a subsequent reversal of the previous good (or poor) relationship between the two states. Regime change brings with it major changes in the institutions that govern both leader selection and the process of policy formation in a state.[1] Given this understanding of regime change, we see that following regime change in a state, some previously influential actors or sets of actors who benefited from the status quo have likely been excluded from

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[1]In this paper I use Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) definition of regime as a set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies, and regime change as a fundamental re-writing of rules governing who can be the leader and who holds policy-making power.

political influence or have seen their influence significantly curtailed while other groups or actors have seen their influence increased. For this reason regime change is much more likely that other less extreme shocks to signal a clear break with past leadership and especially with past policy. Less extreme forms of change in a state's domestic politics –like leader turnover due to elections or normal succession –may signal a change in the winning coalition, and a temporary change in the leadership's preferences regarding the disputed territory. But fundamental changes in the institutions that control leadership selection and policy formation represent change more akin to a reshaping of the selectorate from which any subsequent winning coalition may be drawn. This fundamental change realigns the set of preferences that a leader can usefully attempt to appease in trying to construct a support coalition to support him or her in power, which should fundamentally alter the menu of possible policy options that the new leader can realistically choose from. When two states previously shared good economic and security relations, the removal of a previous regime is significantly more likely to result in a new set of institutions that constrain the subsequent leaders *away* from following those cooperative policies. Similarly, when two states previously shared poor or antagonistic relations, the creation of a new institutional regime is likely to force subsequent leadership to follow a more cooperative path.

Alternately, regime change can be thought of as drawing a new institutional regime (along with a new menu of viable policy options) from the distribution of possible regimes that could govern that state. When the ex-ante relationship between challenger and target is very poor, that relationship is far out in the left tail of the distribution. Thus, a new draw would be expected, on average, to fall farther to the right indicating better subsequent relations and causing the leader of the challenger state to anticipate improved relations and thus improved access to the value of the disputed piece of the territory going further. This expectation would make a cautious "wait-and-see" approach to relations with the new regime the logical choice, and thus leads to a lower probability of hostilities following regime change.

In contrast, when the ex-ante relationship is very good, despite the disputed territory, this relationship can be thought of as being far out in the right tail of the distribution. Thus, a new draw from the distribution would be anticipated to fall further left, indicating poorer subsequent relations. In such a case, the leader of the claimant state, anticipating a decline in trade and security ties with the new regime and the loss of access to the value bound up in the disputed territory. This anticipation of impending loss of access to the value of the disputed territory provides reason for immediate military action to seize that territory.

I argue that the Ukranian revolution of 2014 and subsequent Russian seizure and annexation of disputed territory in Crimea seems to provide an interesting example of a major domestic shock suddenly reactivating a largely dormant dispute and motivating a bout of militarized conflict. Of course, interpretations of the motivation behind Russia's invasion of Crimea abound. Some will likely argue that, in general terms, revolutionary upheaval like the Maidan revolution causes conflict because it weakens one state relative to another, thus motivates predatory behavior during the period of weakness (Walt 1997, Maoz 1989). While it is impossible to know for certain what motives passed through the minds of Russian planners in the Ukraine case, in discussing the results of this study, I will demonstrate empirically that such predatory behavior does not seem to be the primary mechanism by which regime change motivates conflict over disputed territory. Additionally, some argue that the seizure of Crimea was largely motivated by Russian fear of encirclement by NATO (Mearsheimer 2014), though generally fail to acknowledge that Russian aggression seems more likely to motivate further expansion and integration of NATO than to stop it. Others argue that the annexation of Crimea is part of a larger pattern of Russian meddling in the affairs of its neighbors to expand its sphere of influence that has led to a series of "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia, Ossetia, Transnistria, and now Donbas (Mankoff 2014). But these explanations generally fail to clarify why Putin went ahead with the annexation of Crimea but stopped short of that extreme in all other cases. I believe the argument I put forward here provides

a more coherent explanation for the invasion and annexation of Crimea that explains both why Russia took the risk of unifying NATO and the EU against it only to win ownership of a peninsula that it already controlled, and why Russia went ahead with the annexation of Crimea when it has stopped short of annexation in other cases. My argument has the further benefit of closely fitting explanations put forward by others (Treisan 2016) that argue the annexation of Crimea was primarily motivated by Russian fears over the loss of control over the naval facilities at Sevastopol and unhindered access to the Black Sea.

The Russian-Ukrainian dispute over Crimea began shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The dispute centers primarily around two issues. The first issue being ownership and access to the city of Sevastopol, which houses roughly 80% of Russia's warm-water naval infrastructure along with the greater bulk of the Black Sea Fleet (Sasse 1996, p.93-94). The second issue of contention being the Crimean Peninsula's position atop the Kerch Straight. The Kerch Straight controls access from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, and therefor also controls the movement of trading and naval vessels between the vital warm-water port at Rostov-on-Don (along with the entire Volga-Don river system that accesses much of Russia's industrial heartland) and the Black Sea.[2] Crimea also houses a large ethnically Russian population, so holds importance to Russia for cultural reasons as well. Thus, the Crimean peninsula is strategically vital to Russia for both economic and military reasons and is culturally important to the Russian people.

Between 1991 and 1996, major tensions existed between Russia and Ukraine concerning the disposition of Crimea. This dispute motivated at least 3 MIDs during the 1991-1996 period –including 2 cases of actual use of force –along with dozens of dyadic disputes not rising to the level of a MID (Palmer et al. 2015, Maness & Valeriano 2012, King 2006). Tensions eased significantly after 1996 when agreements were signed in which Ukraine agreed

[2]Though admittedly, since the loss of the Crimean peninsula in the early 1990's, Russia has deliberatley expanded and modernized the port at Novorossiysk to reduce it reliance on the Port of Rostov and the Kerch Straight.

to give up its nuclear arsenal and lease the port-facilities at Sevastopol to Russia for a term of 20 years (later extended to 45 years) in exchange for Russian guarantees regarding Ukranian territorial sovereignty (Bebler 2015, Sasse 1997). These agreements served to distribute the value of Crimea as a strategically important territory, and while minor tensions continued –seen in threat-of-force MIDs in 2005 and 2008 (Palmer et al. 2015) these tensions were largely managed peacefully through the signing of additional agreements –such as a 2003 agreement to jointly administer the Kerch Straight and Sea of Azov –so as to provide Russia assurances regarding transit from Rostov-on-Don to the Black Sea. Further, despite ongoing territorial tensions, Russia and Ukraine were major trading partners throughout the 1996-2014 period with Russia being Ukraine's single largest trading partner throughout the time period[3] (Graham & Tucker 2017). Further, the two states cooperated significantly on security issues and share a highly interdependent military-industrial complex due to their common membership in the former U.S.S.R. (Bebler 2015).

Interestingly, these relatively good relations were maintained from 1996-2014 despite not only the existence of an outstanding territorial dispute, but also despite the comings and goings of anti-Russian leadership in Kiev. The election of Viktor Yushchenko –a politician who campaigned on a platform of closer ties with NATO and the European Union and the minimization of Russian influence in Ukraine (Malek 2009) –in 2005 caused a noticeable increase in tensions between the two states (as seen in Russian threats of force made in 2005 and 2008). However, unlike in 2014, the 2004 election of a pro-western and anti-Russian leader to the presidency did not motivate Russia to attempt the seizure of Crimea by force. Why then did Poroshenko's rise in 2014 lead to such an immediate and extreme reaction from Moscow?

The argument I put forth above suggests that, from the Russian point of view, the

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[3]Ukraine ranks within Russia's top 20 trade partners throughout the time period, behind a number of much larger or richer countries such as China, Germany, Japan and the United States.

primary difference between the two episodes of anti-Russian leadership in Ukraine is the revolutionary nature of the 2014 succession. Yushchenko's election in 2005 came against the backdrop of significant protest and accusations of corruption against his opponent Viktor Yanukovych, leading to an unprecedented three rounds of voting due to intervention by the Ukrainian Supreme Court (McFaul 2007). However, at its core, the 2004 election was a democratic election and was ultimately carried out according to democratic institutions. Though Yanukovych's pro-Russian faction was battered at the polls, it still held significant political power within the country, clearly demonstrated six years later with Yanukovych winning the presidency in 2010 in an election reported free and fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE 2010). The political situation following the Maidan revolution in 2014 was different in very important ways. First, unlike the 2004 election, the 2014 revolution was not carried out through a normal political process, thus did not promise Yanukovych and his *Partija Regionov* colleagues the same continued ability to influence policy and compete in subsequent elections that their 2004 electoral loss did. From the Russian perspective, the Maidan revolution was an illegal coup that had put a "fascist junta" into power (Biersack & O'Lear 2014). Second, due to the violence surrounding the Euromaidan protests, Yanukovych himself along with several key political allies were forced to flee Ukraine amid the apparent disintegration of his pro-Russian political party (Kuzio 2015). Thus, whether it is defined as regime change or not, the 2014 revolution clearly wiped way the pro-Russian elements of the "old regime" and eliminated pro-Russian policies from the succeeding government's menu of viable policy options. This "wiping away" of the pro-Russian regime elements is especially salient in the case of Crimea because Yanukovych –in a very unpopular decision –had extended Russia's lease on Sevastopol until 2042 when it had been set to run out in 2017 (Biersack & O'Lear 2014). I argue that the removal and de-legitimization of Yanukovych and his policies caused Russia to believe that his successor would likely abrogate the lease agreement, costing Russia access to 80% of its warm-water

naval architecture, and threatening Russia's continue use of the Azov Sea and Kerch Straight. In response to this potential threat, Russia responded as predicted in the argument above –seizing the strategically valuable territory rather than risk losing access to it.

These considerations lead to the following hypotheses:

H1: When the level of hostilities in an ongoing territorial dispute is low (i.e. the dispute is dormant), regime change increases hostility in the next period.

H2: When the level of hostilities in an ongoing territorial dispute is high, regime change decreases hostility in the next period.

Research Design

Universe of Cases

Territorial Disputes: I identify existing terrestrial territorial disputes for the years 1945-2001[4] using the Issue Correlates of War dataset (Hensel 2014).[5] There are 53 existing dyadic territorial claims during this time period. The argument outlined above requires that we be able to differentiate between the interests that a non-changing State A holds in the State B that undergoes regime change. Thus, I used directed territorial-dispute dyad years as the unit of analysis. Use of the directed dispute dyad allows me to directly measure the economic and security interests a State A –which is the territorial challenger in all cases –holds in the other state rather than relying on aggregate dyad-level measures such as weak-link formulations. The unit of analysis in this study is the directed dispute dyad-year. The 53 ongoing disputes during 1945-2001 provide 1,380 directed dyad-year observations. However, it is important to note that entry into a territorial dispute is a strategic decision undertaken by one or more actors and that a state's propensity to self-select into a territorial dispute

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[4]The Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) regime change dataset that provides the main independent variable in this analysis begins in 1945. ICOW data run out in 2001.

[5]I use only terrestrial territorial disputes –those in which the dispute is over sovereign ownership of land as opposed to river or ocean rights because only the ICOW terrestrial dispute dataset has global coverage. The current river and maritime claims datasets cover only Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Using these datasets in the analysis threatens to introduce regional biases into the findings.

is likely correlated with other aspects of that state's conflict behavior (such as MIDs). As such, failure to account for the non-random selection into territorial disputes would be a signifigant threat to the validity of findings presented in this analysis.

To correct for this non-random selection I employ two-stage probit models, making use of Heckman's correction (Heckman 1976). The dataset for the first stage selection model includes all dyad-years 1945-2001 for all dyads present in the international system according to the Correlates of War State System Membership dataset (Correlates of War Project 2017).[6] The dependent variable for this selection model is involvement of the dyad in a territorial dispute and takes the value "1" for any dyad-year in which the dyad participants are engaged in a territorial dispute with one another, and a "0" otherwise. Dependent variables for the first-stage model are *Trade Dependence*, *S-Score*, *Capability Disparity*, *Joint Democracy*, *Defense Pact*, and *Foreign Policy Similarity*. These variables are described in detail below. The first stage model also includes an exclusion restriction –a variable that effects selection into territorial dispute, but that should not influence MIDs over that disputed territory, conditional upon selection into a territorial dispute. The variable excluded from the second-stage model is *Border Length*, which is measure of the length of the shared border between the two states in a dyad in 1000's of kilometers. This variable comes from the PRIO Boundary Dataset (Furlong & Gleditsch 2003) and provides a useful proxy for the potential for any given border-region to be subject to a dispute. In expectation, the longer a border, the greater potential for a territorial dispute. Border length is appropriate for use in the first-stage model as an exclusion restriction because, while it will influence territorial dispute onset, it is unlikely to effect the onset of MIDs over that territory once a piece of territory has been disputed. The output of the first stage model is then used to construct an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) of the distribution of predicted probabilities of a dyad being party to a

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[6]I include *all* dyads rather than all contiguous dyads because –while uncommon –non-contiguous states do occasionally engage in terrestrial territorial disputes, thus should be included in the selection model. An example of this can be found in the China/Japan dispute over the Senkaku/Diayou islands.

territorial dispute that then enters into the second stage model to correct for sample selection bias as suggested by Heckman (Heckman 1979).

I also include simple Logit models in Table 7 in the online appendix to demonstrate that the results reported below are not dependent on the use of 2-stage Probit or the Heckman correction. The results of these Logit models are substantively very similar to those found when using the Heckman correction in two-stage Probit.

Dependent Variable

Militarized Dispute: I use the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes V4.2 (Palmer et al. 2015) dataset to identify cases of conflict between states. The variable *MID* takes the value "1" in any territorial claim dyad-year in which a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) is initiated by one of the dyad members against the other, and zero otherwise.

Independent Variables

Regime Change: I measure major changes to the domestic politics of a state by using a measure of regime change developed by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). GWF define regime change as a major change in the domestic political institutions that govern selection of the executive as well as those that govern a state's foreign and domestic policy making process. This measure takes the value "1" in any year in which a regime change occurs in the state targeted by a territorial claim, and "0" otherwise.[7]

This is a useful measure because it represents a more consistent strength of treatment than do other measures of domestic political change such as leader turnover or change in a state's winning coalition (SOLS change). On the low end, leader turnover can represent a change as

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[7]I believe that isolating which state undergoes regime change is helpful to understanding who's interests are being threatened, thus provides clearer expectations regarding conflict onset. However, the theory presented above implies that regime change in either state could disrupt the underlying relationship and thus lead to conflict. For this reason I have included Table C.6 in the appendix that displays the results when using a measure of regime change that takes the value "1" in the event *either* state in the disputing dyad experiences regime change. The results are largely the same for variables that measure shared national security interests. However, State A's trade dependence on the target of a dispute only seems to be tied to conflict when regime change occurs in the target state rather than in the initiator of the claim.

simple as the democratic election of a former leader's deputy, such as occurred when George H.W. Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan for the U.S. presidency. This signals far more political continuity than it does change, and thus should not affect conflict behavior as hypothesized above. However, on the high end, leader turnover can also represent revolutionary overthrow, which I would expect to affect conflict behavior. Changes in the source of leader support or SOLS change (Mattes et al., 2016) suffers from the same problem. At minimum, SOLS change may represent only the peaceful and orderly hand off of power from one party to another in a democratic state. On the high end, it may represent complete replacement of all elements of the government. Thus, I would expect to see only the most extreme SOLS changes influence state's conflict behavior noticeably.[8] The GWF measure of regime change avoids this problem. By focusing on major changes to the institutions governing policy and leader selection, the regime change measure ensures that it is capturing a more consistent and larger degree of domestic political change than do other variables. Thus, using regime change to measure domestic political change is far more appropriate to this analysis than are leader turnover or SOLS change.

The *Regime Change* variable is lagged 1 year, to reduce the possibility that endogeneity influences the results discussed below. All other variables are lagged 2 years to ensure that they are measured prior to any regime change. This reduces the possibility that the results discussed below result from changes in shared interest that accompany the regime change.

The ex-ante relationship: I measure the level of cooperation/hostility between parties to an ongoing dispute in three ways –the extent of defense ties, the extent of economic ties, and the absence or presence of recent militarized behavior between the disputants.

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[8]However, I do include robustness checks in the appendix that use SOLS changes, minor SOLS changes (those that represent a power transition between groups within a sitting government), and simple leadership turnover. Consistent with the theory, when the measure of political change used indicates more continuity than change –such as in the case of simple leadership turnover in a stable regime –the effect observed in this study is reversed. Only large shocks that indicate a clear break with the past policy formation process should be thought to lead to the conditional relationship hypothesized above.

I construct three variables to measure the extent of cooperation and interdependence between two states in the security realm. Two variables *ATOP Defense* and *ATOP Nonaggression* measure agreements made between the two states that are party to a dispute. The third variable *Alliance S-Score* measures the extent to which two states that are party to a dispute share similar policy preferences in terms of national defense and are embedded in a shared security community.

I draw information on military alliances from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions dataset (Leeds et al., 2002). *ATOP Defense* is coded "1" for any year in which both states in the dyad share a publicly declared defense pact with one another and "0" otherwise. I also construct the variable *ATOP Nonagression* which takes the value "1" in any year in which the states that are party to a territorial dispute are also signatories to a non-aggression pact as defined by ATOP. Joint membership in a defensive alliance should be thought to represent active cooperation on security, while non-aggression pledges represent a more passive commitment to reduce militarized competition over territorial concerns. As such, I would expect to see a stronger result when states are members of a defense pact, prior to regime change, than when they are only party to a non-aggression agreement.

I construct the *Alliance S-Score* variable in the manner proposed by Signorino and Ritter (1999). S-Score is a measure of the similarity in two states' alliance portfolios. If two states are allied to exactly the same set of external states, this measure takes the value "1", representing that two states are embedded in a security community and presumably share a similar outlook on security issues. If the states instead share no common allies, S-Score takes the value "0".

I also construct a variable to measure the level of economic interdependence between states that are party to a territorial dispute. The argument presented above suggests that it is the losses that accrue to the state *not* undergoing radical domestic change that should drive conflict between the two. Thus I construct a measure of trade dependence that allows

me to capture the economic importance of the target to the territorial claimant. I construct the variable *Trade Dependence A with B* using data drawn from the Graham and Tucker (2017) IPE data resource. These variables capture value of one state's trade with the other as a share of that state's total trade. *Trade Dependence A with B* is measured as $\frac{\text{Trade}_{\text{A with B}}}{\text{Trade}_{\text{A with All}}}$.

Finally, I also construct the variable *Dormant Dispute* to measure the presence or absence of recent militarized behavior over the territorial dispute. If no MID has occurred within the last 15 years, I consider the territorial dispute to have grown dormant. This variable takes the value "1" for any dyad-year in which neither state in the dyad has initiated a militarized interstate dispute (MID) against the other within the last 15 years, and takes the value "0" if one or more MIDs have occured in the dyad within the 15 previous years.

Control Variables[9]

Territorial Salience   The economic and military salience of a piece of territory have been shown to influence the likelihood that militarized disputes occur over a territorial claim and more likely to lead to the initiation of claims (Hensel 2001a, 2001b). Further, it is likely that access to valuable resources and control of strategic territory affects the stability of governments (Morrison 2009, Smith 2004), thus must be controlled for to prevent spurious findings. I use the *Salience* indicator from the Issue Correlates of War dataset (Hensel 2014) to control for the economic and strategic value of a territory under dispute.

Contiguity: States that contend over a shared border rather than isolated islands or other non-contiguous territories should be thought to be more threatening to one another, and thus should maintain higher levels of militarization in their relations, *ceteres paribus.* Thus I control for physical proximity using the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity (V3.2) dataset

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[9]In addition to the control variables listed below, it would be reasonable to control for the possibility that a regime change in question is enforced upon the target state by the claimant state. I attempt to do this by using the ARCHIGOS measures of foreign-imposed and foreign-supported regime change (Goemans, et al., 2009). However, according to ARCHIGOS no cases of foreign imposed regime change occur during the span of these 53 territorial disputes. Thus, the variable measuring foreign-imposed regime change is omitted from these models.

(Stinnett et al., 2002). This variable takes the value "1" for any observation in which the rivals in question share a land or river border.

Joint Democracy   A country's regime type is associated with political stability within the country (Ekman 2009) and a wide ranging literature has shown regime-type to be associated with the conflict behavior of dyads. As such, dyadic regime type must be controlled for. I measure regime type using the Polity IV dataset. *Joint Democracy* is coded using Polity IV data (Marshall & Jaggers 2007) and takes the value "1" in any dyad year in which both states have a polity score of 6+ and "0" otherwise.

Military Power   Militarily powerful states should be both more stable, as they are capable of using oppression effectively if needed, and should be more able to engage in international conflict. Thus, I control for the balance of military power in the dyad using the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) Correlates of War National Material Capabilities V5.0 dataset (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972).

To account for the balance of military capabilities, I construct a variable using the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) measure from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities V5.0 dataset (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972).

Conflict History   The presence and temporal distance of past militarized disputes in a dyad is likely to influence future conflict behavior as well as regime stability. As such, I include a cubic polynomial of years since the last dispute in a dyad in accordance with the procedure suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010).

Results

I begin my analysis by examining simple cross-tabulations. Table 1 displays the bivariate association between regime change in a party to a territorial dispute and the subsequent

onset of MIDs between those disputants.[10] In aggregate, it seems that regime change has little effect on territorial dispute escalation, with MID onsets in both the post-regime change and non-regime change samples being roughly what would be expected by chance. However, if the hypotheses discussed above are accurate, then regime change should be thought to have a conditional effect on escalation, leading to increased hostility in some disputing dyads and decreased hostility in others. Thus what appears as a null result in Table 1 may indicate the existence of countervailing trends that disguise a more complex underlying relationship.

Table 1: Regime Change in Last 5 Years and MID Onset

	No Onset	MID Onset	Total
No Regime Change (Expectation)	716 (709.5)	73 (79.5)	789
Regime Change (Expectation)	525 (531.5)	66 (59.5)	591
Total	1241	139	1,380

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 1.3684$ Pr $= 0.242$

Tables 2-5 display cross-tabulated results between 4 measures of shared interests and MID onset in dyads where one state in the dyad has experienced regime change within the last 5 years. These cross-tabulations provide initial evidence for the existence of the countervailing trends that we would expect to see if my hypotheses hold, and in each case, χ^2 tests show a statistically significant relationship between the relevant measure of shared interests and MID onset. In each table we see that in a dyad where the states in question shared *ex-ante* interests prior to the regime change, the observed occurrence of MID onsets is significantly higher than would be expected by chance. Across the four cross-tabulations, roughly 25% more mids occur between states who had "good" pre-regime change relations than would be

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[10]Note, while the primary regression analysis presented below examines only the more common 1-year lag after regime change, these contingency tables examine a 5-year window following regime change so as to provide a more general understanding of the longer term influence of regime change on the escalation and deescalation of territorial disputes. I also include a series of accelerated failure time models in the appendix –discusses below –that provide a more general understanding of the effect of regime change on MID onset over time.

expected by chance. In contrast, when states shared few interests prior to a regime change in the dyad, the subsequent occurrence of MIDs is significantly lower than would be expected by chance. Across the four tables there are between 1/2 and 3/4 as many MID initiations in the "poor relations" group than would be expected by chance. The relationship displayed in these cross-tabs is, of course, only suggestive given that it accounts for no covariates, but provides initial evidence that the effect of regime change on the escalation or deescalation of territorial disputes seems to be conditional on the level of hostility in the *ex-ante* relationship, as predicted by H1 and H2.

Effect of Shared Interests in 5yr Post-Regime Change Period

Table 2: Alliance Portfolio Similarity

	No Onset	MID	Total
Low S-Score*	184	11	195
(Expected)	(173.2)	(21.8)	
High S-Score	341	55	396
(Expectation)	(351.8)	(44.2)	
Total	525	66	591

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 8.9598$ Pr $= 0.003$

Table 3: Trade Dependence

	No Onset	MID	Total
Low Trade*	238	21	195
(Expected)	(230.1)	(28.9)	
High Trade	287	45	396
(Expectation)	(294.9)	(37.1)	
Total	525	66	591

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 4.3501$ Pr $= 0.037$

Table 4: Nonaggression Pacts

	No Onset	MID	Total
No Pact	187	11	198
(Expected)	(175.5)	(22.5)	
Non-Agg Pact	296	51	347
(Expectation)	(307.5)	(39.5)	
Total	483	62	545

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 10.4501$ Pr $= 0.001$

Table 5: Defense Pacts

	No Onset	MID	Total
No Pact	155	8	163
(Expected)	(144.5)	(18.5)	
Defense Pact	328	54	382
(Expectation)	(338.5)	(43.5)	
Total	483	62	545

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 9.6502$ Pr $= 0.002$

Table 6, below, displays the results of a series of 2-stage Probit models using several different measures of shared interest. The results are supportive of the hypotheses discussed above. In the interactions displayed, the base coefficient for *Regime Change State B* represents the effect on probability of MID onset of a regime change in the target of a territorial claim when the claimant holds no interests of the specified type in the target.[11] All models point to the conclusion that, when states involved in a territorial dispute have relatively poor relations –that is they share few economic or security ties, or have engaged in recent militarized behavior –regime change in the target state appears to reduce the likelihood of a militarized dispute occurring in the following year. This finding supports the second hypothesis discussed above. When parties to a territorial dispute have poor relations, regime change seems to suppress the likelihood of dispute escalation.

These changes in the probability of MID onset are also substantively quite large. Figure 1, below, displays the change in predicted probability of MID initiation dependent on regime change and the challenger's trade dependence on the target when moving from first to third quartile.[12] Comparing across the two plots presented, we see that when trade dependence is at the first quartile, the predicted probability of MID onset is 0.135 in the absence of regime change. This falls to 0.07 (just over half as likely) in the year following regime change. When trade dependence is at the third quartile however, regime change increases the predicted probability of MID onset from 0.11 to 0.36, more than tripling the probability of subsequent MID onsets.

Figure 2 displays the substantive effect of security ties and regime change on MID initiation, using the existence of a formally declared defense pact to proxy for security ties. Interestingly, in the case of defense ties, the conflict-promoting effect of regime change is

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[11]In Model 1, this would indicate 0 trade dependence, 0 shared allies in Model 2, no defense pact in Model 3, no Non-Aggression Pact in Model 4, and in Model 5 would indicate that MIDs have occurred between the two within the last 15 years.

[12]Predicted probabilities are estimated when holding all other variables at observed values.

Table 6: 2-Stage Probit Regression (Heckman Correction) - MID initiation 1945-2001

	Selection Model
Trade Dependence A on B	3.1642*
	1.2804
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.0456
	0.1207
Length of Border 1000's km	0.2322**
	0.0001
Military Capability Disparity	-0.0057
	0.4182
Joint Democracy	-0.0498
	0.1051
Defense Pact	1.1242***
	0.1219
U.N. Voting Similarity	0.1169
	0.0729
Constant	-3.5908***
	0.3507
Observations	1145772

	(1) Trade	(2) S-Score	(3) Defense Pact	(4) Non-Aggression Pact	(5) Dormant Dispute
Regime Change State B	-0.3694	-10.5401***	-4.2385***	-3.3947***	-0.7728*
	0.4040	0.8896	0.3134	0.2600	0.3663
Regime Change State B × Trade Dependence	82.5300**				
	31.0320				
Regime Change State B × S-Score		10.6002***			
		1.1318			
Regime Change State B × Defense Pact			4.2987***		
			0.4671		
Regime Change State B × Non-Agression Pact				3.4731***	
				0.4639	
Regime Change State B × Dormant Dispute					1.1485*
					0.4949
Trade Dependence A on B	-7.5633*	-7.4461*	-7.4461*	-7.4410*	-7.8751+
	3.2935	3.0860	3.0860	3.0896	4.0584
S-Score	-0.6349	-0.5974	-0.5974	-0.5892	-0.7568+
	0.4541	0.4540	0.4540	0.4555	0.3930
Defense Pact	-0.8308*	-0.8869**	-0.8869**	-0.8586*	-0.9841*
	0.3350	0.3421	0.3421	0.3335	0.4037
Non-Agression Pact	0.5708*	0.5717*	0.5717*	0.5318+	0.5071+
	0.2888	0.2896	0.2896	0.2869	0.3012
Dormant Dispute					-0.5561***
					0.1515
Contiguity	-0.0090	-0.0173	-0.0173	-0.0182	-0.0193
	0.1526	0.1551	0.1551	0.1548	0.1776
Salience to Challenger	0.0388	0.0420	0.0420	0.0416	0.0043
	0.1068	0.1062	0.1062	0.1062	0.1607
Salience to Target	0.0963	0.0927	0.0927	0.0926	0.1184
	0.0953	0.0958	0.0958	0.0959	0.1300
Capability Disparity	-1.0918*	-1.0748+	-1.0748+	-1.0757+	-0.7351
	0.5487	0.5580	0.5580	0.5579	0.5156
Joint Democracy	-0.1661	-0.1635	-0.1635	-0.1633	-0.2874*
	0.1422	0.1436	0.1436	0.1436	0.1306
Cold War	-0.2178	-0.2074	-0.2074	-0.2110	-0.1452
	0.1539	0.1574	0.1574	0.1556	0.1519
Inverse Mills Ratio	-0.5288***	-0.5615***	-0.5615***	-0.5656***	-0.7867***
	0.1479	0.1491	0.1491	0.1497	0.1436
Constant	2.2173*	2.2990*	2.2990*	2.3154*	2.6977**
	0.9598	0.9656	0.9656	0.9648	0.9220
Observations	1196	1196	1196	1196	1196

[1] Cubic polynomial of number of years since last MID included in model, but not reported.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

2-tailed standard errors, clustered on the territorial claim.

Figure 1: Effect of Regime Change on MID Initiation - Conditional on Trade

much smaller than in the case of economic ties. In the presence of a defense pact, regime change increases the predicted probability of subsequent MID onset from 0.076 to 0.085 –a modest 12% increase. However, the hypothesized conflict suppressing effect of regime change in the absence of security ties is very pronounced. When the parties to a territorial dispute do not share a defense pact, the predicted probability of MID onset (absent regime change) is 0.32. This predicted probability drops to approximate zero (0.00003) following regime change. Interestingly, it appears that, while a regime change that endangers security cooperation between two parties to a dispute *can* contribute to escalation of the underlying territorial dispute, that it is actually regime changes that threaten economic ties that are by far the most likely to drive dispute escalation. On the other hand, regime change that allows for the potential to develop new security ties in the manner discussed by Ratner (2009) and Siverson and Starr (1994), has a much more drastic conflict-dampening effect.

Finally, Figure 3 displays the effect of regime change on MIDs dependent on whether there have been recent hostilities in the dyad or not. These findings, too, display the hypothesized relationship. When the relationship between parties to a dispute is relatively peaceful –in

Figure 2: Effect of Regime Change on MID Initiation - Conditional on Defense Pact

this case meaning no MIDs have occurred in the last 15 years –regime change leads to a subsequent increase in the probability of MID onset from 0.047 without regime change to a predicted probability of 0.178 subsequent to regime change. This is a 3.78x increase in the predicted probability of MID onset. However, when relations between the parties have been relatively more hostile (including one or more MIDs in the last 15 years), regime change in the target reduces the predicted probability of a subsequent MID by roughly half, from 0.143 to 0.074

These findings contradict the expectations of prominent theorists like Walt (1997, 18-45) and Maoz (1989) who posit that the primary mechanisms by which domestic political shocks like regime change and revolution cause international conflict is by weakening a state, thus making it easy prey for existing enemies (which can also then motivate the now weakened state to behave aggressively to preempt those existing enemies). The finding I present here suggests that this mechanism is not in action in many cases. Rather, domestic political shocks lead to conflict when they endanger existing good relations with other states. It is those "friendly" outside states who have much to lose due to a domestic shock in another

Figure 3: Effect of Regime Change on MID Initiation - Conditional on Dispute Dormancy

state. Enemies, by contrast, appear to believe that they have more to gain by waiting patiently to establish a new relationship with a new regime rather than by paying the costs of fighting over a disputed territory before they learn what cooperation may be possible with the new regime. However, while a large increase or decrease in the 1-year probability of MID onsets is an interesting discovery, the models presented above cannot tell us whether these effects represent transitory 1-year "blips" in the underlying relationship between disputants or whether they lead to a longer-term reduction (or increase) in the likelihood that the dispute turns violent.

To provide some insight into not just strength, but also the duration of this effect, I construct a series of accelerated failure time models (AFT).[13] I specify a Weibull AFT for

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[13]AFT models are selected for this extension because I am interested explicitly in the length of an observed effect. Cox proportional hazard models –while more common in recent usage –provide an understanding of the expected hazard of an event occurring in the next time period. They do not explicitly model change in the expected time until an event occurs. AFT does explicitly model the acceleration or deceleration of events –i.e. the expected length of the decrease or increase in time until the next event. Thus AFTs are much more useful in this extension. Further, in these data Cox models are subject to severe computational difficulties. Due to the relatively small number of cases –53 disputes –and the relative rarity of regime change, significant co-linearity occurs between the dichotomous interaction terms (those including the *alliance*, *non-aggression pact* and *dormant* variable) and the dead/censor variables. This leads to a situation where the Cox model produces point estimates but no standard errors in some specifications. AFT models do not suffer from this computational difficulty.

this extension. The Weibull distribution is more flexible than single-parameter distributions like the exponential, estimating rather than assuming two parameters and allows for the baseline hazard to vary over time.[14] Additionally, in these data it is possible for one dyad to experience multiple failures (MIDs) across time. Repeated events of the same type lead to a situation in which standard errors can be highly inaccurate due to a failure to account for the dependence among repeated events (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, p.156-161) I use the variance-corrected Conditional Gap Time method suggested by Prentice, Williams and Peterson (1981) to address this difficulty[15].

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[14]However, use of the Weibull distribution assumes only monotonic change in the baseline hazard. I use the Weibull AFT in the models reported here for its familiarity to researchers. In keeping with suggested practices and to reduce the risk that the finding presented here results from this assumed functional form I also estimate AFT models using the Generalized Gamma and Log-Normal distributions which relax assumptions inherent when using the Weibull distribution (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). Outputs from these models are displayed in Table 14 and 15 in the appendix. The findings of the Generalized Gamma AFT are very similar to those obtained by using the Weibull distribution. When using the log-normal distribution, findings are largely consistent with the findings of the Weibull model though the interaction terms for Trade Dependence and Dormant Dispute are no longer statistically significant at commonly accepted levels. Fortunately, however, both the Weibull and Log-Normal distributions are nested within the Generalized Gamma. When $\kappa = 1$ the Generalized Gamma is equivalent to the Weibull. When $\kappa = 0$ the Generalize Gamma is equivalent to the Log-Normal instead. This allows us to test which distribution better fits the data by testing whether κ can be distinguished from 0 (or 1). Thus, after estimating each model, I conduct Wald tests of the hypotheses $\kappa = 1$ and $\kappa = 0$. In testing the null hypothesis $\kappa = 1$ for each of the 4 models, the resulting p-values are p= 0.89, p= 0.95, p=0.97, and p= 0.66. Thus in none of the 4 model specifications can we reject the null that $\kappa = 1$, and therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that the data are distributed Weibull. When testing the null hypothesis $\kappa = 0$, the resulting p-values are p= 0.069, p=0.079, p= 0.092, and p= 0.042. As such, we can reject the null hypothesis $\kappa = 0$ with 95% confidence in one model and at the 90% confidence level in the other three. Thus, I argue that Weibull AFT should be thought to best fit these data, and the results obtained from the Log-Normal models should be taken with a grain of salt due to the poor fit of the data distribution.

[15]In a conditional gap-time framework, the time variable is reset to zero after each event, and cluster-robust standard errors are used to account for the dependence between events. The conditional gap-time framework is considered most appropriate so long as failures (MIDs) in the dyad develop sequentially rather than concurrently (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, p.159). While many concurrent issues may be involved in the onset of a MID, I argue that a MID over a disputed territory generally represents the "coming to a head" of all of the various issues of contention over the territory that have built up over the preceding time. This MID is then followed by some degree of peaceful lull before the next (or the same) set of contentious issues again "come to a head" and result in a new MID. This sequential pattern of MID development would imply that the conditional gap-time framework is the most appropriate method of dealing with repeated events. The sequential situation would be contrasted by a concurrent event situation, such as could occur in the study of coup attempts if multiple factions within a country were plotting separate coup attempts at the same time thus meaning the country is concurrently at risk of multiple coup plots (p.159).

Table 7: Weibull Accelerated Failure Time Models 1945-2001

	(1) Trade Dependence b/se	(2) Defense Pact b/se	(3) Non-Aggression Pact b/se	(4) Dormant Dispute b/se
Regime Change State B	0.3060	10.2760***	10.3163***	0.6429*
	0.2877	1.2588	1.3036	0.3236
Regime Change State B × Trade Dependence A on B	-56.4386**			
	21.4816			
Regime Change State B × Defense Pact		-10.3017***		
		1.2979		
Regime Change State B × Non-Agression Pact			-10.3475***	
			1.3787	
Regime Change State B × Dormant Dispute				-1.0457+
				0.5539
Trade Dependence A on B	15.8602+	14.2345+	15.0499+	13.6526+
	9.3297	8.1347	8.6575	7.6861
Defense Pact	-0.0359	-0.3559		-0.1462
	0.3966	0.3190		0.4062
Non-Agression Pact	-0.4498		-0.4376	-0.5332
	0.4195		0.3475	0.4640
Dormant Dispute				0.5601*
				0.2325
S-Score	1.6831***	1.5090**	1.6185**	1.7833***
	0.5113	0.4788	0.4962	0.4977
Contiguity	-0.5908*	-0.5859*	-0.5933*	-0.5773*
	0.2417	0.2334	0.2379	0.2292
Salience to Challenger	0.0915	0.0916	0.0903	0.1056
	0.2243	0.2160	0.2229	0.2562
Salience to Target	-0.1193	-0.1048	-0.1098	-0.1253
	0.2114	0.2062	0.2114	0.2295
Capability Disparity	0.8097	0.7158	0.7730	0.3838
	0.7022	0.6807	0.6908	0.6404
Joint Democracy	0.2123	0.1773	0.2019	0.2793
	0.1887	0.1751	0.1870	0.1870
Cold War	-0.0975	-0.1322	-0.1093	-0.0864
	0.2406	0.2254	0.2444	0.2299
Constant	1.3574+	1.5074+	1.3938+	1.2854
	0.8203	0.8000	0.8134	0.7841
log(scale)	0.3494**	0.3821***	0.3491**	0.2814*
	0.1205	0.0994	0.1139	0.1235
Observations	1296	1296	1296	1296

Table 7 above displays the result of these AFT models.[16] In the AFT output, positive coefficients are associate with a longer time until the next event (a MID) and negative coefficients imply a shorter time until the next event. The AFT model output displayed in Table 13 is consistent with what we would expect given the findings of the Logistic Regression, above. Regime change in the target of a territorial claim has a conditional effect on the expected time until the next dispute in the dyad. When shared interests between the two states are high –or no militarized incidents between the two have occurred in the last 15 years –then a regime change in the target state "accelerates" time until the next MID, meaning that another MID in the disputants will occur much more quickly than in the baseline case. Conversely, when parties to the territorial dispute share few interests or have engaged in recent militarized disputes, then a regime change in the target state significantly decelerates the expected time until the next MID between the two, implying that when states were relatively more hostile prior to the regime change, that they will enjoy a longer than expected period of peace following the regime change.[17] In the territorial disputes examined here, the mean time between MIDs (the mean time till failure) is 9.4 years. When regime change occurs in a dyad where the dispute has grown dormant, the expected mean time between MIDs drops to 3.29 years leading to a 6.11 year average decrease in the length of a peaceful spell. Conversely, a regime change in a dyad where disputants have engaged in recent MIDs lengthens the expected MTTF to 17.86 years –delaying the next MID by nearly 8.5 years. I would argue that an average 8.5-year delay of the next round of potential hostilities represents a substantively important period of peace that –if recognized –could be exploited by mediators and outside parties as a ripe time to attempt to solve a conflict that had previously been quite contentious. Conversely, when two states have managed a dispute

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[16]The model using S-Score as a measure of shared interest that would be analogous to Model 2 in Table 6 suffers from convergence problems when using the Weibull AFT. As such, it is omitted from this table.

[17]Though I note that the coefficient associated with regime change in the absence of trade in Model 1 does not achieve statistical significance.

peacefully in recent memory, regime change in one leads to a very precarious subsequent span of time that must be managed carefully to avoid reigniting the previously dormant dispute.

Conclusion

The forgoing analysis provides us with a new understanding of how major changes in the domestic politics of a state can effect ongoing disputes that state is a party to. Crucially, this study demonstrates that major domestic shocks can not be thought of as having only a single-sided effect on the timing of militarized events during an ongoing dispute. Rather, the findings presented above demonstrate that the effect of a domestic political shock on subsequent dispute behavior is conditional on the *ex-ante* relationship between the disputants. Those states that have maintained relatively warm economic and security relations despite an ongoing territorial dispute are likely to see their shared ties damaged by a domestic shock in one state, which increases the salience of owning a contested piece of territory and leads those states into a period of militarized contention over the disputed territory. In contrast, challengers that have poor *ex-ante* relations with their territorial target are likely to perceive a domestic shock in the target state as an opportunity to improve relations with the target, and thus access the value of disputed territory without paying the cost of fighting to claim it.

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2　Appendix A

Table 8: Logistic Regression of MID Initiation Within Ongoing Territorial Disputes 1945-2001

	(1) Trade	(2) S-Score	(3) Defense Pact	(4) Non-Aggression Pact	(5) Dormant Dispute
Regime Change State B	-0.7990	-210.4850***	-12.7455***	-12.5884***	-0.9830*
	0.5873	24.4578	0.6431	0.6122	0.4740
Regime Change State B × Trade Dependence A on B	185.7613***				
	48.7355				
Regime Change State B × S-Score		210.6549***			
		24.7668			
Regime Change State B × Defense Pact			12.9153***		
			0.8650		
Regime Change State B × Non-Agression Pact				12.7677***	
				0.8623	
Regime Change State B × Dormant Dispute					1.6705+
					0.8782
Trade Dependence A on B	-18.8748+	-17.6620+	-17.6603+	-17.6455+	-17.9282+
	11.1909	10.1395	10.1375	10.1262	10.5816
S-Score	-2.1514**	-2.0561**	-2.0561**	-2.0515**	-2.6806***
	0.7370	0.7391	0.7391	0.7405	0.6689
Defense Pact	-0.6984	-0.7477	-0.7475	-0.7238	-0.2306
	0.5221	0.5306	0.5306	0.5255	0.5467
Non-Agression Pact	1.7532**	1.7278**	1.7277**	1.6999**	1.4773**
	0.5617	0.5547	0.5546	0.5561	0.4630
Dormant Dispute					-1.0384**
					0.3360
Contiguity	0.6020*	0.6244*	0.6244*	0.6248*	0.7969*
	0.2616	0.2615	0.2615	0.2612	0.3254
Salience of Challenger	0.0548	0.0649	0.0649	0.0646	-0.0615
	0.2023	0.2024	0.2024	0.2025	0.3933
Salience to Target	-0.0103	-0.0328	-0.0328	-0.0332	0.1336
	0.2121	0.2169	0.2169	0.2170	0.3404
Capability Disparity	-1.4214	-1.3607	-1.3608	-1.3602	-0.8416
	0.8649	0.8767	0.8767	0.8766	0.9429
Joint Democracy	-0.2542	-0.2335	-0.2335	-0.2331	-0.3418
	0.2661	0.2670	0.2670	0.2671	0.2550
Cold War	-0.2546	-0.2364	-0.2363	-0.2376	0.0069
	0.2831	0.2897	0.2897	0.2887	0.2980
Peace Years	-0.2566***	-0.2576***	-0.2575***	-0.2575***	
	0.0437	0.0437	0.0436	0.0436	
Peace Years^2	0.0081***	0.0081***	0.0081***	0.0081***	
	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	
Peace Years^3	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
Constant	1.1314	1.0668	1.0667	1.0677	0.0055
	1.1853	1.2133	1.2132	1.2135	1.1041
Observations	1315	1315	1315	1315	1315

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

2-tailed standard errors, clustered on the territorial claim.

Table 9: Linear Dyad-Claim Random Effects - MID initiation 1945-2001

	(1) Trade	(2) S-Score	(3) Defense Pact	(4) Non-Aggression Pact	(5) Dormant Dispute
Regime Change State	-0.0381	-0.4011*	-0.1160*	-0.0969*	-0.1044**
	0.0496	0.1893	0.0578	0.0485	0.0364
Regime Change State × Trade Dependence A on B	9.5308+				
	6.8831				
Regime Change State B × S-Score		0.4138*			
		0.2404			
Regime Change State B × Defense Pact			0.1296+		
			0.0826		
Regime Change State B × Non-Agression Pact				0.1168+	
				0.0849	
Regime Change State B × Dormant Dispute					0.1824*
					0.0800
Trade Dependence A on B	-0.1057+	-0.1040+	-0.1026+	-0.0998+	-0.0437
	0.0760	0.0742	0.0732	0.0739	0.0574
Defense Pact	0.0149	0.0145	0.0117	0.0166	0.0165
	0.0316	0.0318	0.0326	0.0321	0.0358
Non-Agression Pact	0.0444*	0.0442*	0.0449*	0.0403+	0.0442*
	0.0265	0.0264	0.0266	0.0266	0.0247
Dormant Dispute					-0.0910*
					0.0500
Salience of Challenger	-0.0168	-0.0178	-0.0179	-0.0182	-0.0640+
	0.0270	0.0273	0.0273	0.0273	0.0486
Salience to Target	0.0279	0.0286	0.0289	0.0290	0.0000
	0.0256	0.0258	0.0258	0.0258	.
Capability Disparity	-0.2784+	-0.2782+	-0.2808+	-0.2811+	-0.5792+
	0.1803	0.1826	0.1829	0.1829	0.4073
S-Score	-0.0506	-0.0484	-0.0461	-0.0474	0.1636*
	0.0755	0.0750	0.0749	0.0751	0.0856
Joint Democracy	-0.0272	-0.0277	-0.0279	-0.0281	-0.0486+
	0.0243	0.0245	0.0244	0.0245	0.0322
Cold War	-0.0115	-0.0093	-0.0101	-0.0111	0.0200
	0.0265	0.0273	0.0271	0.0267	0.0260
Peace Years	-0.0089***	-0.0088***	-0.0088***	-0.0089***	
	0.0028	0.0028	0.0028	0.0028	
Peace Years^2	0.0002**	0.0002**	0.0002**	0.0002**	
	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	
Peace Years^3	-0.0000**	-0.0000**	-0.0000**	-0.0000**	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
Constant	0.3797+	0.3762+	0.3783+	0.3802+	0.6741+
	0.2503	0.2526	0.2530	0.2530	0.4480
Observations	1315	1315	1315	1315	1315

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test
1-tailed standard errors, clustered on the territorial claim.

Table 10: Logistic Regression SOLS Changes - MID initiation 1945-2001

	(1) Trade	(2) S-Score	(3) Defense Pact	(4) Non-Aggression Pact	(5) Dormant Dispute
Major SOLS Change	0.0280	10.7052	0.3548	-11.3614***	0.2467
	0.5556	47.8316	0.3996	0.8908	0.5396
Major SOLS Change × Trade Dependence A on B	66.3363				
	48.3810				
Major SOLS Change × S-Score		-10.3504			
		47.7182			
Major SOLS Change × Defense Pact			[1]		
			[1]		
Major SOLS Change × Non-Agression Pact				11.7539***	
				0.9549	
Major SOLS Change × Dormant Dispute					-0.3385
					1.0248
Trade Dependence A on B	-18.2804+	-17.8860+	-17.8861+	-17.7935+	-17.9442+
	10.6302	10.1855	10.1856	10.1437	10.4814
Contiguity	0.6135*	0.6154*	0.6154*	0.6130*	0.7738*
	0.2606	0.2602	0.2602	0.2591	0.3217
Defense Pact	-0.7304	-0.7474	-0.7474	-0.6593	-0.2693
	0.5265	0.5256	0.5256	0.5245	0.5433
Non-Agression Pact	1.7645**	1.7677**	1.7678**	1.6671**	1.4681**
	0.5670	0.5643	0.5643	0.5542	0.4583
Salience of Challenger	0.0718	0.0668	0.0668	0.0677	-0.0840
	0.2010	0.2028	0.2028	0.2030	0.3904
Salience to Target	-0.0367	-0.0363	-0.0363	-0.0371	0.1555
	0.2136	0.2162	0.2162	0.2161	0.3400
Capability Disparity	-1.3232	-1.3319	-1.3319	-1.3350	-0.9337
	0.8653	0.8644	0.8644	0.8649	0.9617
S-Score	-2.1177**	-2.1006**	-2.1006**	-2.0825**	-2.6211***
	0.7344	0.7321	0.7321	0.7307	0.6746
Joint Democracy	-0.2222	-0.2205	-0.2205	-0.2173	-0.3254
	0.2658	0.2660	0.2660	0.2652	0.2606
Cold War	-0.2373	-0.2321	-0.2321	-0.2307	0.0198
	0.2844	0.2849	0.2849	0.2836	0.3026
Peace Years	-0.2579***	-0.2573***	-0.2573***	-0.2574***	
	0.0437	0.0434	0.0434	0.0432	
Peace Years^2	0.0082***	0.0081***	0.0081***	0.0081***	
	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	
Peace Years^3	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
Dormant Dispute					-0.9188**
					0.3429
Constant	1.0424	1.0473	1.0473	1.0437	-0.0120
	1.1992	1.2031	1.2031	1.2029	1.1396
Observations	1315	1315	1315	1315	1315

[1] Omitted from model due to model convergence difficulties.

$+ p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$, $*** p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

2-tailed standard errors, clustered on the territorial claim.

Table 11: Logistic Regression Minor SOLS Changes - MID initiation 1945-2001

	(1) Trade	(2) S-Score	(3) Defense Pact	(4) Non-Aggression Pact	(5) Dormant Dispute
Minor SOLS Change	0.1773	0.0208	-0.2272	-0.2366	0.5906+
	0.2541	0.5177	0.5501	0.5492	0.3086
Minor SOLS Change × Trade Dependence A on B	-141.4897*				
	69.5193				
Minor SOLS Change × S-Score		-0.4599			
		0.8151			
Minor SOLS Change × Defense Pact			-0.1326		
			0.7963		
Minor SOLS Change × Non-Agression Pact				-0.1192	
				0.8048	
Minor SOLS Change1 × Dormant Dispute					-2.5304**
					0.9730
Trade Dependence A on B	-14.0767+	-16.1772+	-16.2069+	-16.2151+	-15.2430+
	7.8717	9.2864	9.3372	9.3284	9.0796
Dormant Dispute					-0.7708*
					0.3747
Contiguity	0.6637*	0.6154*	0.6190*	0.6191*	0.7722*
	0.2879	0.2825	0.2871	0.2879	0.3611
Defense Pact	-0.8636	-0.8026	-0.7929	-0.8106	-0.3677
	0.5326	0.5440	0.5391	0.5527	0.6021
Non-Agression Pact	1.5189**	1.4543**	1.4555**	1.4724*	1.2228*
	0.5613	0.5601	0.5572	0.5781	0.4834
Salience of Challenger	0.1188	0.1147	0.1139	0.1139	0.0413
	0.2134	0.2140	0.2152	0.2155	0.4106
Salience to Target	-0.1196	-0.1157	-0.1167	-0.1168	0.0146
	0.2125	0.2149	0.2163	0.2163	0.3454
Capability Disparity	-1.5445+	-1.5924+	-1.5946+	-1.5943+	-1.2947
	0.8648	0.8791	0.8770	0.8769	0.9752
S-Score	-1.7463*	-1.6717*	-1.7147*	-1.7154*	-2.2728**
	0.6805	0.6929	0.6876	0.6882	0.7260
Joint Democracy	-0.0364	-0.0478	-0.0496	-0.0496	-0.1418
	0.2848	0.2849	0.2855	0.2864	0.2855
Cold War	0.0909	0.0759	0.0776	0.0771	0.3472
	0.3092	0.3033	0.3045	0.3045	0.3501
Peace Years	-0.2457***	-0.2479***	-0.2480***	-0.2479***	
	0.0403	0.0402	0.0404	0.0403	
Peace Years^2	0.0077***	0.0078***	0.0078***	0.0078***	
	0.0017	0.0017	0.0017	0.0017	
Peace Years^3	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
Constant	0.9066	0.9577	0.9889	0.9901	-0.1157
	1.1050	1.1162	1.1125	1.1150	1.0995
Observations	1258	1258	1258	1258	1258

[1] Omitted from model due to model convergence difficulties.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

2-tailed standard errors, clustered on the territorial claim.

Table 12: Logistic Regression Leadership Turnover - MID initiation 1945-2001

	(1) Trade	(2) S-Score	(3) Defense Pact	(4) Non-Aggression Pact	(5) Dormant Dispute
Expected Successor	0.4985	0.8888	0.6854	0.6694	0.6013
	0.3522	0.6376	0.4986	0.5009	0.3940
Expected Successor × Trade Dependence A on B	-36.3275				
	31.6303				
Expected Successor × S-Score		-0.6926			
		0.8333			
Expected Successor × Defense Pact			-0.5153		
			0.6757		
Expected Successor × Non-Agression Pact				-0.4951	
				0.6672	
Expected Successor × Dormant Dispute					-0.3003
					0.5089
Trade Dependence A on B	-14.8307+	-16.4844+	-16.5568+	-16.5637+	-15.8217+
	8.8244	9.7501	9.7813	9.7729	9.3885
Dormant Dispute					-0.9150*
					0.3644
Contiguity	0.6123*	0.6472*	0.6348*	0.6303*	0.7592*
	0.2901	0.2860	0.2888	0.2906	0.3587
Defense Pact	-0.8459	-0.8203	-0.7474	-0.8583	-0.2960
	0.5506	0.5526	0.5740	0.5522	0.5876
Non-Agression Pact	1.4949**	1.4663*	1.4498*	1.5638**	1.1775*
	0.5776	0.5765	0.5824	0.5945	0.4721
Salience of Challenger	0.0907	0.1002	0.1042	0.1016	0.0365
	0.2093	0.2148	0.2188	0.2175	0.3925
Salience to Target	-0.0966	-0.1110	-0.1104	-0.1074	0.0298
	0.2168	0.2227	0.2226	0.2213	0.3393
Capability Disparity	-1.5472+	-1.5482+	-1.5576+	-1.5588+	-1.2875
	0.8923	0.9089	0.9187	0.9191	0.9654
S-Score	-1.7363*	-1.6730*	-1.7371*	-1.7422*	-2.3221**
	0.6939	0.6908	0.7124	0.7154	0.7171
Joint Democracy	-0.0738	-0.0556	-0.0649	-0.0705	-0.1526
	0.2855	0.2859	0.2867	0.2871	0.2735
Cold War	0.0740	0.0737	0.0716	0.0736	0.3345
	0.3072	0.3091	0.3098	0.3102	0.3420
Peace Years	-0.2437***	-0.2471***	-0.2474***	-0.2474***	
	0.0406	0.0406	0.0409	0.0410	
Peace Years^2	0.0076***	0.0077***	0.0077***	0.0078***	
	0.0017	0.0017	0.0017	0.0017	
Peace Years^3	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
Constant	0.9239	0.8830	0.9019	0.9064	-0.0952
	1.1299	1.1371	1.1469	1.1481	1.0826
Observations	1258	1258	1258	1258	1258

[1] Omitted from model due to model convergence difficulties.

$+ p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

2-tailed standard errors, clustered on the territorial claim.

Table 13: Logistic Regression of MID initiation 1945-2001 (Regime change in either state)

	(1) Trade	(2) S-Score	(3) Defense Pact	(4) Non-Aggression Pact	(5) Dormant Dispute
Regime Change Either State	0.0677	-224.8558***	-13.7887***	-15.4815***	0.0746
	0.3703	16.2931	0.4726	0.5179	0.5308
Regime Change × Trade Dependence A on B	5.4423				
	10.8584				
Regime Change × S-Score		225.3630***			
		15.9321			
Regime Change × Defense Pact			14.1624***		
			0.4975		
Regime Change × Non-Aggression Pact				15.8151***	
				0.5183	
Regime Change × Dormant Dispute					-0.0146
					0.8052
Trade Dependence A on B	-15.9481	[1]	-14.5344+	-17.0649+	-15.2692+
	9.8262	[1]	8.0744	9.4000	9.0317
S-Score	-1.7643*	-1.4857*	-1.6953**	-2.0523**	-2.1897***
	0.6886	0.7074	0.6427	0.6877	0.6375
Defense Pact	0.7941+	0.4764	0.6317	-0.6304	0.8948*
	0.4242	0.4090	0.4064	0.5359	0.3918
Non-Aggression Pact				1.5196**	
				0.5581	
Dormant Dispute					-0.9954**
					0.3325
Contiguity	0.5902*	0.4092	0.5475*	0.5866*	0.7596*
	0.2507	0.2648	0.2494	0.2672	0.3157
Salience of Challenger	0.0747	0.0003	0.0478	0.0489	-0.0715
	0.2064	0.2234	0.2050	0.2018	0.3991
Salience to Target	-0.0424	0.0764	-0.0042	-0.0043	0.1340
	0.2198	0.2362	0.2175	0.2163	0.3459
Capability Disparity	-1.3875	-2.0176*	-1.4479+	-1.3888	-0.8765
	0.8853	0.9595	0.8787	0.8821	0.9680
Joint Democracy	-0.1428	-0.2794	-0.1371	-0.2217	-0.1851
	0.2706	0.2684	0.2704	0.2729	0.2523
Cold War	-0.0980	-0.2942	-0.1181	-0.2429	0.1674
	0.2952	0.2822	0.2962	0.2989	0.3024
Peace Years	-0.2539***	-0.2534***	-0.2568***	-0.2585***	
	0.0413	0.0407	0.0407	0.0423	
Peace Years^2	0.0078***	0.0074***	0.0079***	0.0082***	
	0.0017	0.0016	0.0017	0.0018	
Peace Years^3	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	-0.0001***	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
Constant	0.8371	1.3657	0.9287	1.1135	-0.3029
	1.2225	1.3251	1.1880	1.1912	1.1507
Observations	1315	1315	1315	1315	1315

[1] Omitted from model due to model convergence difficulties.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ in two-tailed test

2-tailed standard errors, clustered on the territorial claim.

Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Regime Change on Trade Dependence

Figure 5: Marginal Effect of Regime Change on Defense Pact

Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Regime Change on Non-Aggression Pact

Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Regime Change on Dispute Dormancy

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Table 14: Weibull Accelerated Failure Time Models 1945-2001

	(1) Trade Dependence b/se	(2) Defense Pact b/se	(3) Non-Aggression Pact b/se	(4) Dormant Dispute b/se
Regime Change State B	0.3060	10.2760***	10.3163***	0.6429*
	0.2877	1.2588	1.3036	0.3236
Regime Change State B × Trade Dependence A on B	-56.4386**			
	21.4816			
Regime Change State B × Defense Pact		-10.3017***		
		1.2979		
Regime Change State B × Non-Agression Pact			-10.3475***	
			1.3787	
Regime Change State B × Dormant Dispute				-1.0457+
				0.5539
Trade Dependence A on B	15.8602+	14.2345+	15.0499+	13.6526+
	9.3297	8.1347	8.6575	7.6861
Defense Pact	-0.0359	-0.3559		-0.1462
	0.3966	0.3190		0.4062
Non-Agression Pact	-0.4498		-0.4376	-0.5332
	0.4195		0.3475	0.4640
Dormant Dispute				0.5601*
				0.2325
S-Score	1.6831***	1.5090**	1.6185**	1.7833***
	0.5113	0.4788	0.4962	0.4977
Contiguity	-0.5908*	-0.5859*	-0.5933*	-0.5773*
	0.2417	0.2334	0.2379	0.2292
Salience to Challenger	0.0915	0.0916	0.0903	0.1056
	0.2243	0.2160	0.2229	0.2562
Salience to Target	-0.1193	-0.1048	-0.1098	-0.1253
	0.2114	0.2062	0.2114	0.2295
Capability Disparity	0.8097	0.7158	0.7730	0.3838
	0.7022	0.6807	0.6908	0.6404
Joint Democracy	0.2123	0.1773	0.2019	0.2793
	0.1887	0.1751	0.1870	0.1870
Cold War	-0.0975	-0.1322	-0.1093	-0.0864
	0.2406	0.2254	0.2444	0.2299
Constant	1.3574+	1.5074+	1.3938+	1.2854
	0.8203	0.8000	0.8134	0.7841
log(scale)	0.3494**	0.3821***	0.3491**	0.2814*
	0.1205	0.0994	0.1139	0.1235
Observations	1296	1296	1296	1296

Table 15: Generalized Gamma Accelerated Failure Time Models 1945-2001

	(1) Trade Dependence b/se	(2) Defense Pact b/se	(3) Non-Aggression Pact b/se	(4) Dormant Dispute b/se
Regime Change State B	0.3021	10.5204*	10.2610*	0.7008+
	0.2763	4.8266	4.9302	0.3797
Regime Change State B × Trade Dependence A on B	-55.2152*			
	23.7062			
Regime Change State B × Defense Pact		-10.5434*		
		4.7034		
Regime Change State B × Non-Agression Pact			-10.2908*	
			4.8000	
Regime Change State B × Dormant Dispute				-1.1243+
				0.6348
Contiguity	-0.5935*	-0.5877*	-0.5942*	-0.5849*
	0.2394	0.2351	0.2394	0.2468
Trade Dependence A on B	16.4387	14.4638	15.1724	12.4657
	10.6378	9.6186	10.1224	8.2897
Defense Pact	-0.0513			-0.1199
	0.4052			0.4620
Non-Agression Pact	-0.4379		-0.4376	-0.5434
	0.4607		0.3470	0.4843
Dormant Dispute				0.6067*
				0.2894
Salience of Challenger	0.0957	0.0931	0.0913	0.0799
	0.2173	0.2112	0.2191	0.2670
Salience to Target	-0.1158	-0.1026	-0.1088	-0.1190
	0.2241	0.2225	0.2269	0.2272
Capability Disparity	0.7730	0.7004	0.7646	0.4617
	0.7134	0.6792	0.7160	0.7462
S-Score	1.7074***	1.5209**	1.6234**	1.7192***
	0.5014	0.5248	0.5048	0.5149
Joint Democracy	0.2175	0.1797	0.2031	0.2610
	0.1721	0.1630	0.1737	0.1832
Cold War	-0.1145	-0.1394	-0.1134	-0.0422
	0.3095	0.2832	0.3243	0.3313
Defense Pact		-0.3576		
		0.3109		
Constant	1.3808+	1.5159*	1.3986+	1.2086
	0.7875	0.7626	0.7967	0.9365
/				
lnsigma	-0.3459**	-0.3803***	-0.3480***	-0.2950*
	0.1123	0.0952	0.1047	0.1155
kappa	1.0765+	1.0354+	1.0180+	0.8242*
	0.5876	0.5909	0.6058	0.4087
Observations	1296	1296	1296	1296

Table 16: Log-Normal Accelerated Failure Time Models 1945-2001

	(1) Trade Dependence b/se	(2) Defense Pact b/se	(3) Non-Aggression Pact b/se	(4) Dormant Dispute b/se
Regime Change State B	0.6440	31.9664***	3.8623***	0.9913+
	0.5731	5.2221	0.4577	0.6002
Regime Change State B × Trade Dependence A on B	-144.2834			
	116.8173			
Regime Change State B × S-Score		-32.1044***		
		5.4877		
Regime Change State B × Non-Agression Pact			-3.9987***	
			0.6456	
Regime Change State B=1 × Dormant Dispute				-1.2609
				0.8199
Contiguity	-0.6191*	-0.6109*	-0.5830*	-0.6621*
	0.3061	0.2912	0.2958	0.3375
Trade Dependence A on B	9.5729**	8.4062**	9.3509*	8.7617*
	3.5307	2.9477	3.8398	3.4099
S-Score	1.1258	0.7715+	1.1640+	1.1170
	0.7393	0.4554	0.6808	0.8264
Defense Pact	0.6576			0.4770
	0.4586			0.4951
Non-Agression Pact	-0.9370+		-0.3419	-0.8580+
	0.4799		0.3601	0.5074
Dormant Dispute				0.8375*
				0.3362
Salience of Challenger	-0.1288	-0.0940	-0.0997	-0.1681
	0.2625	0.2543	0.2593	0.2869
Salience to Target	-0.0558	-0.0492	-0.0907	0.0225
	0.2503	0.2374	0.2425	0.2609
Capability Disparity	1.3724	1.1241	1.2433	0.9818
	0.9157	0.8610	0.8972	0.9175
Joint Democracy	0.0405	-0.0410	0.0256	0.0326
	0.2593	0.2439	0.2468	0.2671
Cold War	0.3701	0.2378	0.2837	0.4158
	0.3703	0.2948	0.3266	0.4126
Constant	0.9621	1.3267	1.1895	0.5557
	1.1308	1.0105	1.0487	1.2199
/				
lnsigma	-0.4330***	-0.4766***	-0.4535***	-0.3960***
	0.0992	0.0935	0.0961	0.1025
Observations	1296	1296	1296	1296